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I. INTRODUCTION
T he lower federal courts and state courts have been applying the first
amendment in student press cases arising at public colleges
and high schools since 1967.1 But ordinary first amendment analysis is
inadequate in most student press disputes. As a result the courts in
some cases have been unable to articulate satisfactorily the bases for
good decisions.2 And in other cases the real issues generated in student
press litigations have been ignored.3 The reason for the conceptual
difficulties is that the student press is a form of expression that is paid for
by the state, while the first amendment's role historically has been to
protect the citizen against the state; the courts have tried to decide the
student press cases without taking the fact of state subsidization into full
account.4
This Article evaluates the cases so far decided, and proposes a new
approach to student press disputes which would rationalize what the
courts have intuitively done correctly in the past, and which also, if
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University;
B.A., Fordham University; LL.B., Yale Law School.
1 Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as
moot, Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968). See infra text at notes 27-32.
2 See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F.
Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971).
3 See, e.g., Avins v, Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920
(1968); Panarella v. Birenbaum, 37 A.D.2d 987, 327 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971),
aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 108, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 296 N.E.2d 238 (1973); see infra text accompanying
notes 164-67.
4 This Article is not about the underground student press nor the cases that have
arisen from attempts to censor such independent student newspapers. See, e.g., Eisner v.
Stanford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2nd Cir. 1971). Underground press cases present
relatively straightforward first amendment issues: independent (albeit young) private
publishers are pitted against government regulators.
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adopted, would provide a better framework for decision in the kind of
cases in which present methods produce questionable results. Under the
analysis proposed, the student press would be recognized as a form of
"state speech" which enjoys constitutional protection, but which as a form
of state action is also subject to special constitutionally mandated
constraints.
The reported cases fall into four categories. The categories, and the
summarized results in each category, are as follows:
1) The "sanction-censorship" cases: Administrators tried to punish
student editors and writers after publication had occurred or tried to
control content, before publication, and the editors resisted. Courts have
ordered editors reinstated as students after dismissal by school authori-
ties, 5 and restored students, with back pay, to their jobs on the editorial
staff of student papers after school officials had removed them.6 There is
no case upholding administrative sanctions of student editors and writers
for what the students had published in a school periodical. And, there is
no case support for administrative sanctions directed at the periodicals
themselves: a total cut-off of newspaper funds and a change from a
"mandatory student fee" support system to an optional support system
were both held impermissible. 7 Indeed, outside of the Second Circuit,
every administrative attempt to control editorial content in a student
publication has been held unconstitutional.8
A Second Circuit case and a federal district court case within the
Second Circuit both held that there are circumstances in which high
school authorities can block distribution of a high school student period-
ical.9 These cases also held that material in the school paper could be
prohibited if, in the judgment of educators, it would be harmful to
teenagers. The Second Circuit rule is inconsistent with the results in
I Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1973); Dickey, 273 F. Supp. 613, (M. D. Ala
1967) uacated as moot, Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th cir. 1968).
' Schiffv. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266
(D. Colo. 1971).
' Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973); Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279
(8th Cir. 1983).
' Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570,
modified, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, Fortune v. Bazaar, 416 U.S. 995 (1974);
Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1973); Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484
F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731
(E.D. Va. 1977), affd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164
(E.DN.Y. 1974), affd mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2nd Cir. 1975); Koppel v. Levine, 347 F. Supp.
456 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971); Antonelli v.
Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md.
1970); Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 296 N.E.2d 238 (1973),
affg 37 A.D.2d 987, 327 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1971).
' Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978);
Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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cases including both high school and college level publications every-
where else. 10
2) The "access" cases: Students (and others) who were not editors tried
to force publications to print what the outsiders submitted. It has been held
that an individual has no right to have an article published in a state
university's law review,11 nor to have either a news item or an advertis-
ing notice concerning a meeting of gay students published in a state
university's newspaper. 12 On the other hand, cases have held there is a
right to place editorial advertising about the Viet Nam War and other
political issues in both high school and college papers.1 3
3) The "mandatory fee" cases: Students (and others) who were not
editors objected to what the publication was printing with their money.
Three federal courts'4 and two state courts15 have held that the exaction
of mandatory student fees which subsidize the student newspaper does
not infringe the constitutional rights of students who disagree with the
paper's editorial policies. And, a New York court' 6 has held that fee-
paying students and taxpayers have no first amendment right to require
university officials to make and enforce rules keeping blasphemy and
anti-religious diatribes out of the student press. In the sanction-cen-
sorship case that held administrators could not influence editorial
content by eliminating mandatory fees, the Eighth Circuit said a differ-
ent constitutional question would be presented if imposition of the fees
were challenged by the students who pay them.' 7
(4) The defamation cases. A New York case 18 and a Louisiana case' 9
hold that persons libeled in a state subsidized student newspaper have no
10 There is dictum in another case approving the Second Circuit rule for censorship
under limited circumstances at the high school level. Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist.,
484 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
"' Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
12 Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), reh'g denied,
541 F.2d 281, cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977).
"3 Lee v. Bd. of Regents of State College, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969), affd, 441
F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
'" Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983); Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp.
1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974), offd mem., 526 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913
(1976); Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp 149 (D. Neb. 1973), affd mem., 478 F.2d 1407
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
15 Larson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Nebraska, 189 Neb. 688, 204 N.W.2d 568
(1973); Good v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Washington, 86 Wash. 2d 94, 542 P.2d
762 (1975).
" Panarella v. Birenbaum, 37 A.D.2d 987, 327 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1971).
17 Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983).
1s Mazart v. State, 109 Misc.2d 1092, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981). In other
cases the issues of liability for libel was raised in the suit but not reached by the courts. E.g.,
Langford v. Vanderbilt, 44 Tenn. App. 694, 318 S.W.2d 568 (1958); Scelfo v. Rutgers, 116
N.J. Super. 403, 282 A.2d 445 (1971); Mitcham v. Bd. of Regents, No. 9196 (Tex. Ct. App.
Apr. 3, 1984).
'" Milliner v. Turner, 436 So.2d 1300 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 442 So.2d 453 (La.
1983).
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cause of action for defamation against the state (in New York) nor
against the university (in Louisiana).
The decisions in each category are evaluated in the four sections that
follow. The case for the "state speech" analysis is first developed and then
applied in the "sanction-censorship" section and then applied also to the
cases in the succeeding parts of the Article.
II. THE SANCTION-CENSORSHIP CASES
The sanction and censorship cases hold that in the context of student
publications, student editors have first amendment rights and school
authorities do not have first amendment rights; the authorities' attempt
to control content is therefore state censorship and forbidden by the first
amendment.
That student editors using state facilities have first amendment rights
enforceable against school administrators is the most accepted and least
examined idea in all the student press litigation. The student speech that
the courts protected from censorship would clearly have been "protected
speech" if it were issued by a private publisher: e.g., criticism of
government officials; 20 tasteless, crude articles;21 illiterate villifica-
tions;22 racist propaganda. 23 The school officials in most cases asserted an
institutional interest in preventing such material from being published
in the school paper.24 The courts often were sympathetic to the adminis-
trators' evaluation of the likely impact of what the students were doing,
but they held that the students had the right to do it anyway. 25 The courts
rejected without discussion the analytic framework for the relationship
between editors and school authorities that was urged in the first
reported case and which is echoed in later cases as well: that the
university is a hierarchal community in which student editors have a
place in the chain of command below the school president and below the
publication's faculty advisor.2 6 Instead, the courts treated the student
20 Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ,, 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as
moot, Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968).
21 Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp 1329 (D. Mass. 1970).
22 Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975).
23 Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
24 E.g., Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973) (theory that publication speaks
for school); Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973)(theory that publication was
prohibited by the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Gambino v.
Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va. 1977), affd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.
1977)(theory that school administrators had control of content through control of school
curriculum); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970)(theory that right of
editorial control flowed with state funding); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970)
(theory that university must apply state flag desecration statute).
25 E.g., Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257, 261 (5th Cir. 1975).
26 Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613, 617 (M.D. Ala. 1967)("in-
subordination" was "the sole basis" for sanctioning the student editor), vacated as moot,
[Vol. 34:267
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editors essentially as if they were private publishers, even though the
students used state revenues to issue their publications.
If student editors are private publishers, the cases do not present
significant censorship or sanction issues: for private publishers, freedom
from censorship and sanction is normal and inevitable under the first
amendment. What makes the cases remarkable, if the student editors are
private publishers, is their unexamined premise that public funds must
support private publications.
Instead of confronting the public subsidy issue, some courts ignored or
sidestepped it by making narrow holdings which purported to leave room
for the fact of public subsidy to have operative effect in the future. In
other cases, public funding was an operative fact, but the rationales built
around it to account for the student editors' freedom of expression are not
persuasive.
The cases begin with Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education.27
Lynn Dickey was a student editor at Troy State College in Alabama. He
drafted an editorial that supported, on academic freedom grounds, a
position taken by the president of the University of Alabama in a dispute
between the university president and the Alabama governor and legis-
lature. The faculty advisor to the college paper at Troy State ordered the
academic freedom editorial killed and an article entitled "Raising Dogs in
North Carolina" printed instead. Dickey had the paper published with a
white space labeled "censored" where the editorial (or dog article) would
have been. He was dismissed from Troy State for "insubordination" and
for violating a rule against printing anything in the school paper that
was critical of the governor or the legislators. The theory behind the rule,
according to the Troy State administrators, was that the governor and
legislators were acting for the "owner" of the state supported school paper
and a newspaper could not criticize its owner.28
Dickey sued and the federal district court ordered him reinstated as a
student. The court said it was "basic in our law"29 that the "privilege to
communicate concerning a matter of public interest [was] embraced in
the [flirst [a]mendment"' 0 and that the first amendment rights of
students were protected against unreasonable rules and regulations
promulgated by school administrators. The no-criticism-of-the-owners
rule was found unreasonable because it was not related to maintaining
Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257,
259-60 (5th Cir. 1975)(university president "dismissed" the student editor).
2 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as moot, Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402
F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968). The Fifth Circuit said that the district court order, once vacated,
had not precedential effect. Later however, the Supreme Court cited the district court
decision with approval in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969), apparently breathing new life into the district court's disposition of the Dickey case.
28 Dickey, 273 F. Supp. at 616.
29 Id. at 617.
30 Id.
1986]
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order and discipline on campus. Moreover, the court said the rule could
not be invoked against Dickey because using it against him as the basis
for the insubordination charge was "cloaking" what was really going on:
the punishment of the student "for exercising his constitutionally guar-
anteed right of academic and/or political expression."31 The state could
not "force this student to abandon his constitutionally protected right of
freedom of expression as a condition to his attending a state supported
institution. " 32
Thus, under the court's rationale, Dickey's right to freedom of expres-
sion in the columns of the college paper was not an issue in the case; it
was a premise. The court cited the "flag salute" case 33 as if there were no
difference between the right to exercise editorial control over the college
paper and the first amendment right to decline to participate in saluting
the flag. In effect, the opinion in Dickey says that the right to communi-
cate is equivalent to the right to do the communicating in the pages of the
college paper.
Once that right was posited, it followed that it could only be curtailed
by "reasonable" rules. Therefore, the unreasonable no-criticism-of-the-
owners rule could not be enforced. That rule was crudely articulated, but
its promulgation was essentially an assertion by the administrators of
their power to control state facilities at their college. Holding the rule to
a reasonableness test necessarily allocated part of that power away from
the administrators and toward the student editor. The district court,
however, dealt with the power issue only indirectly and in doing so drew
back from the full implications of its decision. The administrators had
argued that a decision in Dickey's favor was tantamount to a student
take-over of the college press. The court's response was that "there was no
legal obligation on the school authorities to permit Dickey to continue as
one of its editors. '34 So the holding in Dickey was narrow. Punishment
after the fact of publication was forbidden. But the issue of actual
day-to-day pre-publication control over the student press was avoided.
Under Dickey, the student editor's first amendment rights would only last
as long as the school administrators allowed the editor to remain in office.
However, in the next sanction-censorship case, editorial control at the
pre-publication stage was at issue. And this time the administrators lost
that issue as well. Antonelli v. Hammond35 holds that administrators
cannot use the threat of a cut-off in funds to force a system of prior review
on the editorial staff of a college paper. The court directly addressed the
public funding issue, asking whether the fact that "the expenses of
31 Id. at 618.
2 Id. See infra text accompanying notes 35-43.
13 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (cited in Dickey, 273
F. Supp. at 617-18).
14 Dickey, 273 F. Supp. at 618.
" 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970).
(Vol. 34:267
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publishing.., are payable by the college... significantly alter[s] either
the rights of the students or the powers of the college president over the
college press?"36 The answer was "No." The reason was that "[i]n cases
concerning school-supported publications or the use of school facilities,
the courts have refused to recognize as permissible any regulations
infringing free speech when not shown to be necessarily related to the
maintenance of order and discipline within the educational process."
3 7
The authorities cited were (1) Dickey,38 (2) cases holding that school
administrators could not keep unpopular speakers
39 (and an artist)40 out
of speakers programs (and campus art gallery), and (3) a case holding
that students could place anti-Viet Nam War ads in the campus paper
over the objections of school officials. 41 From the cases cited, it is clear
that the Antonelli court thought a case involving campus editors' rights
was essentially the same as a "public forum" case concerning the rights
of students to have access to state college facilities. The court's own
articulation of the reason why the students prevailed was that "Ib]ecause
of the potentially great social value of a free student voice in an age of
student awareness and unrest, it would be inconsistent with basic
assumptions of [flirst [almendment freedoms to permit a campus news-
paper to be simply a vehicle for ideas the state or the college deem
appropriate." 4 2 As the Antonelli court itself put it, "assumptions" about
first amendment freedoms played a role in the outcome. Thus, while
Antonelli went beyond Dickey in holding that prior review was unconsti-
tutional, it, too, stopped short of giving student editors complete control
over the student press. In dictum, the court said that the administrators
could impose a rule that only articles written by the students themselves,
not reprints from other publications, would be printed in the school
paper. 43
However, in the cases decided since Dickey and Antonelli, except for
high school disputes in the Second Circuit, 44 there has been no holding
and only the weakest suggestion 45 that administrators share in editorial
36 Id. at 1336.
37 Id. at 1337.
3' 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967). Antonelli, 308 F. Supp. at 1337.
39 Id. at 1337 (citing Snyder v. Bd. of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Brooks
v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala.), affd mer., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969);
Smith v. Univ. of Tennessee, 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969)).
41 Close v. Lederle, 303 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Mass. 1969) rev'd 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970).
41 Antonelli, 308 F. Supp. at 1337 (citing Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.
1969)).
42 Antonelli, 308 F. Supp. at 1337.
43 Id.
4' Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1978);
Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
45 See Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970). Korn held that a flag descration
statute was unconstitutional as applied by school administrators. Therefore it could not be
19861
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control to any extent whatsoever. Even in the Second Circuit cases that
upheld the administrators' control, the parties agreed and the courts
recognized that the student press was protected by the first amendment.
The controls that the administrators imposed were upheld because the
censorship rules at the high school level had only to meet a "rational
basis" test which the courts thought the administrators had met. 46
Indeed, after Antonelli most courts treated the question of first amend-
ment protection for the subsidized students' press as settled.47 Most
the basis for censoring a student publication. The court declared generally that the
university officials could not use the flag descration statute in the future to censor materials
"of the type" they had tried to censor in the case. (It was irrelevant that the administrators
had relied on an opinion of the Maryland attorney general that the student publication
violated the statute.) However, the opinion does not explicitly exclude the possibility of
future administrative censorship, were the administrators to apply the statute constitu-
tionally. See also Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971), in which the district
court reinstated a student editor dismissed by school officials. On the facts, the court found
it unnecessary to decide whether a college might establish a non-free student press under
the control of the college journalism department. Id. at 1270. See also Gambino v. Fairfax
County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Vir. 1977): "While the state may have a
particular proprietary interest in a publication that legitimately precludes it from being a
vehicle for [flirst [a]mendment expression, it may not foreclose constitutional scrutiny by
mere labeling." Id. at 734 (dictum). In the Fifth Circuit, "special circumstances" theoreti-
cally may justify censorship. Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973); Schiff v.
Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975). But no case of special circumstances has arisen.
"Special circumstances" in those cases means that a publication would "lead to significant
disruption on the university campus or within its education processes." Id. at 261.
" "On appeal both parties agree that the defendant's restraint of the students' effort to
collect and disseminate information and ideas involves rights protected by the [fMirst
[a]mendment." Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 516 (2nd Cir. 1977).
In determining the constitutionality of restrictions on student expression such as
are involved here, it is not the function of the courts to reevaluate the wisdom of
the actions of state officials charged with protecting the health and welfare of
public school students. The inquiry of the district court should have been limited
to determining whether defendants have demonstrated a substantial basis for
their conclusion that distribution of the questionnaire would result in significant
harm to some ... students.
... A federal court ought not impose its own views in such matters where there
is a rational basis for the decisions and actions of the school authorities.
Id. at 519. Strictly speaking, Trachtnman is not a "school newspaper" case. The issue was
whether the editors of the high school paper could distribute a "sex questionnaire" to the
students. The answers to the questions would then have been the basis for an article by the
editors in the school paper. Trachtman, however, was followed in Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F.
Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), which is a genuine school paper case. In Frasca, too, "the
parties agree[d] that a high school newspaper is generally protected by the [flirst
[almendment." Id. at 1048. The parties disagreed about how much constitutional protection
should be afforded a paper that leveled false charges at a member of student government,
and was distributed on the last day of school when no response was possible, and which, in
the school officials' opinion, would have been otherwise disruptive as well. The district court
purported to follow Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and apply
Trachtman in deferring to the authorities' judgment that the paper would have led to a
break down in order and discipline at the high school. Frasca, 463 F. Supp. at 1048-52.
" The courts ignored the suggestion in Development in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81
[Vol. 34:267
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administrative attempts at sanction and censorship were struck down
with little or no discussion on the basis of the already decided subsidized
press precedents.48 Other courts reached the same conclusion but treated
official subsidized school papers essentially as if they were private
publications, citing cases dealing with the rights of students who issued
underground papers. 49 A few cases followed Antonelli in suggesting,
HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968), that a special and lesser freedom of the press prevail on the
campus.
[T]he student press should [not necessarily] enjoy the same privilege of
nonmalicious reporting afforded to critics of public figures under the New York
Times decision and its progeny. A university might reasonably conclude that in
view of the damage that can be done by false reporting, as well as the inexperience
or possible irresponsibility of student editors, a rule banning criticism not based
on demonstrable fact is justifiable in order to encourage responsible editorial
comment.
Id. at 1130.
" Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970), disposed of the administrators' claim
to editorial control because of public funding with quotes from Dickey and A ntonelli. 317 F.
Supp. at 143. Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D. Colo. 1971), also cited Dickey and
Antonelli as dispositive. "Well charted waters" was how the Fourth Circuit in Joyner v.
Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973), characterized the case law applicable to the
denial of financial support by college authorities to a college paper because the authorities
disagreed with its editorial policy. The decision in Joyner required the college to resume
funding a racist college paper. In Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973), affd as
modified, 489 F.2d 225 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 995 (1974), the court noted that the
university had "apparently conceded" that the public forum rule ofA ntonelli was applicable
to disputes between student editors and school officials. Id. at 575. Bazaar was then cited as
the "dispositive case" within the Fifth Circuit in Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257, 260 (5th
Cir. 1975), which held that administrators could not prevent publication of a student
magazine that was embarrassing to them because of its "poor grammar, spelling and
language expression." Id. at 261. In Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731
(E.D. Vir. 1977), the court upheld the first amendment rights of high school editors, and
held that state funding did not preclude application of the first amendment. Id. at 734
(quoting A ntonelli).
"9 In Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the court transformed a
subsidized school publication case into a private funding case because the public funds had
already been expended by the time the case came to trial. "The name of the school did not
appear on the publication, and expenditures involved in its duplication had already
occurred. For the purposes of this litigation this literary magazine had the character of
private creation by the student editors." Id. at 460. Therefore the court treated the question
whether the school principal had discretion to control a publically funded magazine as not
presented. Id. Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1973), and Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F.
Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), involved, respectively, "a college newspaper" and an extracur-
ricular high school "student newspaper" for which no academic credit was given. Thonen,
491 F.2d at 723; Bayer, 383 F. Supp. at 1165-66. Inferentially, neither was an underground
paper and public funds were involved. Nevertheless, Thonen relied principally on Papish v.
Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973), and Bayer relied principally on Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); both Papish and Tinker involved privately funded
expression by students, not subsidized school newspapers. See infra text accompanying
notes 52-57. Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980),
contains no reference to the possible significance of public funding on the power of school
administrators to censor a high school publication. It cites both public funding and private
1986]
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without elaboration, that disputes between student editors and school
administrators should be analyzed under the "public forum" theory.50
One case repeated an idea that had appeared in Dickey: sanction or
censorship could not be imposed on student editors because school
administrators could not attach "unconstitutional conditions" to the right
to attend a public college.51
No case reached the United States Supreme Court. But, the Court's
handling of other student cases probably contributed to the developing
body of lower court law applying the first amendment to protect student
editors from attempts by school administrators to exercise editorial
control. In Tinker v. Des Moines Board of Education,52 the Court held that
high school students could not be disciplined by school authorities for
expressing opposition to the Viet Nam War by wearing black armbands
to school.5 3 In Papish v. Board of Curators,54 the Court held that an
funding cases in support of the student editors' freedom of expression. Indiscriminate
citation of the underground press cases is common in opinions that do recognize that public
funding might be a differentiating factor. See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.
1975); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973); Gambino v. Fairfax County School
Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va. 1977), afTd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977).
5" "The cases involving student publications are quite similar to, and own much of their
rationale to, those cases which have been characterized as 'open forum' cases." Bazaar v.
Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 1973). "Once a [student] publication is determined to
be in substance a free speech forum, constitutional protections attach and the state may
restrict the contents of that instrument only in accordance with [flirst [a]mendment
dictates." Gambino v. Fairfax, 429 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Va. 1977). "The state is not
necessarily the unfettered master of all it creates. Having established a particular forum for
expression, officials may not then place limitations upon the use of that forum which
interferes with protected speech and are not justified (sic) by an overriding state interest."
Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D. Colo. 1971). See also Korn v. Elkins, 317 F.
Supp. 138, 143 (D. Md. 1970).
5 "[I]f a college has a student newspaper, its publication cannot be supressed because
college officials dislike its editorial comment .... This rule is but a simple extension of the
precept that freedom of expression may not be infringed by denying a privilege. Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)." Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir.
1973)(citations omitted). See also Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D. Md. 1970), where
the court quotes Development in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1968):
The notion that the state can condition the grant of a privilege on the surrender
of a constitutional right ... has been discredited by the Supreme Court .... With
the removal of this obstacle to judicial relief, school regulations restricting
student extracurricular speech .. .will be subjected to the requirements of the
first amendment.
Id. at 1129. Tinker cites Dickey in connection with unconstitutional conditions. Tinker, 393
U.S. at 506.
52 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
" Under the first amendment, rules limiting expressive student conduct could only be
enforced if the rules were reasonably related to maintaining order and discipline on campus.
The holding in Tinker limiting school regulation of student speech to what was required for
maintenance of "order and discipline" had been anticipated by the federal district court in
Dickey. Dickey, 273 F. Supp. at 617-18. In Dickey, of course, the speech was taking place in
the subsidized student press, while in Tinker the students provided their own armbands.
[Vol. 34:267
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss2/6
FIRST AMENDMENT, AND STATE SPEECH
underground student newspaper issued at a state university was entitled
to first amendment protection. And, in Healy v. James,5 5 the Court held
that a student organization's official recognition by the college could not
be conditioned on the abandonment of otherwise protected associational
rights.56
Tinker, Papish, and Healy clearly establish that students have first
amendment rights. But, they do not compel a reading of the first
amendment that would force the states or schools to pay for the expres-
sion that students engage in when at school.57 And, the theories that the
lower courts and commentators have said were supportive of the student
editors' first amendment rights are also not helpful in explaining the
sanction-censorship cases.
The first step in the student press as "public forum" rationale is
recognition that a person does not forfeit first amendment rights on
becoming a student.58 This is the same premise that underlies the
students' right to publish private, underground student papers. The leap
from recognition of the right to exercise freedom of expression in general,
to the right of freedom of expression in the particular context of the
subsidized school paper, is accomplished, in the courts' opinions, by
viewing the student editors' opportunity to use the subsidized press as a
given which requires no further consideration.59 This "once given can't be
Tinker's facts therefore presented a not atypical first amendment dispute: privately
supported expression versus official sanctions. However, the Supreme Court in Tinker cited
the district court decision in Dickey with approval (Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 514) as if the
application of the "maintenance of order and discipline" rule were the same in both cases.
Id- at 509.
54 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
55 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
" As this Article goes to press, there has been another Supreme Court case decided
involving the first amendment rights of students; Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, cert.
granted, 106 S.Ct 56 (1985). The case was decided on July 7, 1986. 106 S.Ct 3159 (1986).
(The Court held that the school district acted entirely within its permissible authority in
imposing sanctions upon student in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech
used in nominating a candidate at a student assembly where student was given adequate
warning of the consequences of such behavior).
" In Healy, however, the Court did note that at the defendant college one of the benefits
of official recognition was that a "recognized" student organization would be given some
access to the pages of the school newspaper for its organizational announcements. 408 U.S.
at 176. See infra text accompanying notes 58-65.
" See Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 1973); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp.
1266, 1269-70 (D. Colo. 1971)(both citing Tinker, the leading case on the first amendment
rights of students).
" In cases where administrators tried to impose sanctions after the fact of publication,
this view is consistent with what had really happened: being in the position of editor, a
student was able to control what did appear in print. But when administrators tried to
censor before publication, and the student's opportunity to control publication was not an
actual concrete reality, the courts have said that the students nevertheless have control
because in the past the administrators had given them the opportunity for free speech, and
once given, it became protected by the first amendment and could not be taken back.
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taken back" idea is then characterized by the courts as a manifestation in
the school paper context of the operation of the "open forum" or "public
forum" theory.60
The difficulty with this approach is that disputes between student
editors and school authorities are disputes about the power to exercise
affirmative control over the school paper. But a public forum, such as a
bulletin board, is a common carrier whose overall substantive content is
not subject to anyone's control. 6' The logic of the public forum theory
would make the editors no different from all other students. Yet, there is
no intimation in the public forum cases protecting editors from adminis-
trative censorship that the courts intended, or foresaw, the elimination of
the student editors' editorial prerogatives as the logical consequence of
their analysis. While it might make some sense to compare a student
newspaper to a public forum when outsiders seek access to its columns,62
the analogy is extremely weak and adds nothing to the rationality of the
decisions that protect student editors from interference by school admin-
istrators. Reliance on the public forum idea to protect the editors'
editorial judgments against the administrators only confused the
sanction-censorship opinions.6 3
The "unconstitutional conditions explanation" is also inadequate. It
purports to explain the student editors' right to be free from administra-
tive censorship as a natural consequence ofjudicial repudiation of the old
rights-privileges dichotomy. 64 Thus, according to the modern view which
repudiates the distinction, the benefit of being a student editor or of
having access to the pages of a student newspaper, while perhaps only
"privileges" in some sense, nevertheless cannot be taken away from a
student because the student exercises a first amendment freedom. The
reason this principle is inapplicable in the student press cases can be
illustrated by contrasting those cases with a situation in which the
"unconstitutional conditions" rule would apply. Suppose that a student
editor were removed from his position by school administrators (thus
effectively censoring his input into the student paper) because the editor
made a speech on a local television station. A classic example of
"unconstitutional conditions" would be presented, and the student would
" Trujillo, 322 F. Supp. at 1270; Bazaar, 476 F.2d at 575; Gambino v. Fairfax, 429 F.
Supp. 731, 735 (E.D. Va. 1977); Antonelli, 308 F. Supp. at 1336.
61 See Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287, 1350
(1979); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1
(1965); Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access and the First Amendment,
28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975).
61 See infra text accompanying note 102-23.
61 See Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67
CALIF. L. REV. 1104, 1141-42 (1979); see also Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of
Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1219 (1984).
" Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HsAv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
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be entitled to reinstatement. The television speech, on the student's own
time and in his individual capacity, would clearly be entitled to first
amendment protection. Therefore the school administrators could not
make it a "condition" of being an editor that the student forego making
television speeches that he would otherwise have a right to make under
the first amendment. But the very issue in the censorship-sanction cases
is whether or not the student editors do have any first amendment
protection in the subsidized press. It therefore begs that question to try to
answer it in terms of unconstitutional conditions, and the rejection of the
rights-privileges distinction.
Thus, the legitimacy of turning over public funds to private publishers
who enjoy first amendment protection is never articulated nor even
squarely addressed in the sanctioncensorship cases. While commentators
tend to agree that the cases were correctly decided, the lack of analytic
rationale for the decisions has not gone unnoticed.6 5 In reaction, one
author suggests that disputes between student editors and school admin-
istrators do not raise constitutional issues but are a matter of contract
law and should be left to state courts applying state law.66 Others have
proposed that the censorship disputes be analyzed as if a student
newspaper were a broadcast licensee,67 or the sort of private enterprise
with public overtones,6 8 such as a parking garage, that the Supreme
Court held to constitutional standards in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority.69 In Professor Yudof's view, the theoretical explanation for the
results in the cases is that the holdings serve the first amendment
interest of limiting the power of government (in the form of school
administrators) to achieve a communications monopoly with respect to a
captive audience (the student body).70
The trouble with the contract law analysis is that what characterizes
the student press cases is fundamental misunderstanding as to their
rightful prerogatives on both sides of the disputes. What is missing is a
meeting of the minds. In the long run, the contract theory, for which there
" See Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression
and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REv. 863, 882 (1979).
66 Cass, supra note 61, at 1350-51.
67 Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications for Public
Broadcasting, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1123 (1974). Public broadcasting itself would seem a more apt
analogy. The public broadcasting system is paid for with public monies. Some lower court
cases in that area allude to the school newspaper litigation, while not presenting the issues
found in the santioned censorship school disputes: public broadcasting had censored itself
but had not been censored by its funding sources. See Muir v. Alabama Educ. Tel. Comm.,
656 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1981), on rehearing, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1023 (1983). See also Fed. Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 104
S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
6 Newall, A Right of Access to Student Newspapers at Public Universities, 4 J. COL. &
UNIv. LAw 209 (1977).
69 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
70 M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 218-20 (1983).
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is no case authority, is troublesome for those who favor freedom of
expression in the student press because what students can be said to have
gained by bargaining, future courts would hold they have given back in
later bargaining. The broadcast licensee and parking garage analogies
are interesting but ignore the most salient difference between student
press cases and other first amendment disputes: the absence in the
student cases of any indentifiable private economic enterprise whatso-
ever.
While Professor Yudof is certainly correct in observing that cases
protecting student editors from administrative censorship do have some
tendency to prevent the government from drowning out dissident voices,
and that such a result is consistent with the spirit if not the letter of the
first amendment, the Yudof formulation, like the other rationales, does
not account for the major analytic anomaly in the sanction-censorship
cases: the fact that publications paid for with public funds are given first
amendment protection.
All of these considerations suggest that there may be another way of
looking at the entire problem. Instead of focusing on the student editors'
personal individual rights, which (because the students are publicly
subsidized) are demonstrably hard to justify in a traditional first amend-
ment framework, the clash between student editors and school adminis-
trators could be seen as an intra-governmental freedom of expression
dispute in which one branch, the student publication, is in conflict with
another branch, the school administration. If the premise is adopted that
one component of government can have first amendment rights enforce-
able against another component, the apparently futile attempt to artic-
ulate the individual rights of student editors is made irrelevant and
unnecessary. At the same time, the focus that this approach puts on a
particular government component, instead of on an individual's rights, to
see whether the component ought to have constitutional protection, forces
consideration of the real reasons why protection should be granted or
denied. While the parties to the cases have been student editors, the
editors as citizens, students, and individuals had no special right to the
use of government funds for their expression. 71 The editor's case, and
therefore their claim to first amendment protection, derived entirely from
the government subsidized institution for which they worked. The state
speech approach thus makes the nature of the state enterprise claiming
first amendment protection an important issue, and asks what kind of
government component should get first amendment protection. In doing
so, the analysis required under the state speech theory would bring to the
surface and take into formal account what the courts are doing anyway.
71 There is also one case holding that a faculty adviser to a college paper has standing
to raise a first amendment challenge to a cut-off of funds for the paper. Student editors were
also plaintiffs. State Bd. for Community Colleges & Occupational Educ. v. Olson, 687 P.2d
429 (Colo. 1984).
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Thus, the opinions in some of the decided cases 72 recite that the student
editors were popularly elected, without explicitly articulating why the
vindication of their rights was more legitimate on that account. A
commentator 73 has critically pointed out that a premise for the cases is
that there exists in nature a species known as the "student newspaper,"
which courts first identify before vesting its editors with constitutional
rights. The government speech theory makes that identification part of
the rationale for decision.
Moreover, protection of student editors from administrative censorship
is more compatible with the overall purposes and values of free expres-
sion under a "protected government speech" analysis than it is under an
individual speech theory. For example, Professor Emerson has identified
four bases for freedom of expression: 1) it is a means for achieving
individual self-fulfillment; 2) it is a means to the truth; 3) it is a method
to achieve participation by citizens in social and political decisionmaking;
and 4) it is needed to maintain balance between stability and change in
society.7 4 Emerson's theory was developed for application to the typical
free speech conflict in which the state opposes the individual. But, his
theory needs a curious adaptation when brought to bear on the typical
school administrator versus student editor case. The "individual fulfill-
ment" goal has to be eliminated in that context because there is no reason
why an individual editor's "fulfillment" should be preferred, in the sense
of having a constitutional right to be subsidized, over all the other
members of the school and taxpaying community. Thus, the easiest school
paper case to decide on its facts,7 5 one that holds a college president
cannot prevent the student paper from depicting him as a cartoon
character, cannot be explained in terms of "individual fulfillment": there
is no reason why the editor's and cartoonist's fulfillment in publicly
laughing at the president should be preferred to the president's "fulfill-
ment" in censoring the cartoon.
The fact that no "individual fulfillment" interests can legitimately be
served in the student press censorship cases makes such cases different
from typical first amendment disputes. And it is exactly that difference
that has elsewhere been recognized as the main difference between
government speech and individual speech. 76 "Government speech", so
long as it is not the only kind of speech, does serve the other three
interests which make freedom of expression worthwhile.
72 Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 476 (4th Cir. 1983); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F.
Supp. 1329, 1331 (D. Mass. 1970). Other school papers were run by students who were not
democratically chosen, but selected by journalism departments- E.g., Frasca v. Andrews,
463 F. Supp. 1043, 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)(high school paper); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp.
1266, 1268 (D. Colo. 1971)(college paper).
" Canby, supra note 67, at 1142-43.
14 T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-15 (1963).
Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (D. Colo. 1971).
76 M. YUDOF, supra note 70, at 43; see also Yudof, supra note 65, at 865-66.
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These same values (excluding individual self-fulfillment) would also be
served if the "government speech" analysis were applied to various other
forms of speech that may well deserve protection. For example, it would
seem to be a good idea to uphold the right of a dissenting judge to have his
dissenting opinion printed in his court's official reports, even if the
majority, or the chiefjudge, or whoever else might be in charge wanted to
suppress the opinion.7 7 Similarly, if an ombudsman (in either a govern-
ment or university context) prepared a report that the authorities wanted
suppressed, the report's publication might nevertheless be desirable and
it might be entitled to constitutional protection. The dissenting judge and
the ombudsman, as individuals, would have no more right than any other
citizen to subsidized publication of their opinions. But first amendment
protection of their (governmental) speech at government expense might
be warranted by their institutional positions. Some other kinds of official
or quasi-official subsidized expression might also at least be candidates
for protection under the protected government speech theory. 78
71 See Musmanno v. Eldredge, 382 Pa. 167, 114 A.2d 511 (1955); but see United States
v. Kilpatrick, No. 83-1363 (10th Cir. Jan. 3, 1984)(ex parte emergency order barring West
Publishing Co. from printing in the bound volumes of the Federal Supplement the opinion
of a federal district judge), reported in the Nat'l L.J., Jan. 30, 1984, at 3, 36; the restraining
order was lifted by the Tenth Circuit on January 24, 1984. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1984, at 1,
col. 2. The former judge whose opinion the Justice Department succeeded in temporarily
suppressing had little to say: "Does a judge have First Amendment rights? I don't know. I'm
not going to file any lawsuit." Nat'l L.J., January 30, 1984, at 36. The white space where the
censored opinion would have been published appears on a page marked 505-21 in volume
570 of the Federal Supplement. West apparently has not published the opinion despite the
lifting of the censorship order. See also Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California
Supreme Court, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 514 (1984); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980). A federal district court judge's remarks were ordered suppressed in Gardner v.
A.H. Robbins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1194 (8th Cir. 1984). See Gross, Judicial Speech:
Discipline and the First Amendment, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1181 (1986).
78 The Supreme Court in Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), held that the
Central Intelligence Agency was entitled to the earnings from a book by a former agent
written without agency clearance. The Snepp decision and imposition of lifetime censorship
over the writings of not only former CIA agents but all government agency officers, blurs
the distinction between private and public speech. See, e.g., Internal Security Order,
Department of Justice, 2620.8 implementing National Security Decision Directive-84
"Safeguarding National Security Information" issued by President Reagan, March 11, 1983,
48 Fed. Reg. 39,313 (1983). The internal security order requires Justice Department
employees and contractors to sign pre-publication clearance agreements subjecting their
writings to prior restraint for life. Penalties for failure to submit to pre-publication review
could be imposed even if what were ultimately published contained nothing "classified."
The Administration in March 1984 informally agreed not to enforce this policy until further
notice to Congress. See also, Note, Freedom of Speech, National Security, and Democracy:
The Constitutionality of National Security Decision Directive 84, 12 W. ST. L. REV. 173
(1984); Office of Management and Budget Circular A-122 "Cost Principles for Non-Profit
Organizations." 45 Fed. Reg. 46022 (1980). Revisions proposed in 1983 would have stripped
federal funds from any organization engaged in "advocacy." Advocacy would have included
presenting expert testimony requested by Congress or a state legislature, and submission of
amicus curiae briefs to the courts. Notice, 48 Fed. Reg. 3348 (1983). Later proposed revisions
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As it is, cases that have already arisen in at least one other area
demonstrate the utility of the protected government speech analysis,
compared to the individual rights model, Thus, the theory is useful in
dealing with peculiar situations such as cases in which prison newspaper
editors have sought first amendment relief from censorship by the
wardens. 79 A federal district court in Vermont80 and the Supreme Court
of California-' have held that once a state prison newspaper is estab-
lished, the prisoners are in charge of content unless the wardens can
persuade the court that security, order, or prisoner rehabilitation justify
censorship. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit left the wardens in
effective control, holding that the prison authorities' judgment about the
adverse impact of particular newspaper articles on institutional interests
would be deferred to, even though all the federal judges who heard the
case thought the articles were harmless.82
The Vermont federal court found the college newspaper cases directly
on point.8 3 Any rationale that cannot distinguish a college newspaper
from a penitentiary newspaper would seem to have a blind spot. Yet on
the level of purely individual rights, the general rule for students, that
they do not forfeit constitutional protection on the campus, is similar to
the general rule for inmates, that they retain all constitutional protec-
tions not incompatible with the fact of incarceration.8 4
would less severely restrict a subsidized organization's public expression. Notice, 48 Fed.
Reg. 50860, 56463 (1983).
To the extent that the government asserts a proprietary interest in the speech of people
in private life, making their speech the government's own for purposes of profits, then there
will be a need for the development of constitutional protection for this new form of
"government speech." The political climate for such development is not promising. But the
school paper cases provide a theoretical underpinning for it none the less.
79 See Note, First Amendment Rights of Prisoners: Freedom of the Prison Press, 18
U.S.F.L. REV. 599 (1984); Note, The First Amendment Rights of Prison Newspaper Editors,
65 VA. L. REv. 1485 (1979).
o Luparer v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974).
"' Bailey v. Loggins, 32 Cal.3d 907, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575, 654 P.2d 758 (1982).
82 Pittman v. Hutto, 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1979). In California the courts acknowledge
a "judicial obligation of deference to the professional expertise of corrections officials
. . . [but do not] uphold administrative decision which are neither even-handed in
application nor consonant with fundamental constitutional principles." Huston v. Pulley,
196 Cal. Rptr. 155, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)(mandating publication in the prison paper of a
cartoon of people engaged in sex on a guillotine, and of a photo of a nude woman). Huston
also relied on a California statute protecting prisoners, CAL. PENAL CODE §2600 (West 1984).
The Fourth Circuit decision in Pittman was also premised on the existence of the prisoner's
individual right to publish a prison newspaper. That right however was rendered largely
ephemeral because of the extremely light burden of proof that the court said wardens had
to sustain in order to justify censorship.
83 See Luparer, 382 F. Supp. at 501. See also, Bailey, 32 Cal.3d at 919 n.7, 187 Cal. Rptr.
at 583 n.7, 654 P.2d at 766 n.7, Huston, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 157 n.5.
84 Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)(student
rights) with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)(prisoners' rights). See Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974).
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Perhaps prison newspapers should be given genuine first amendment
protection. But the real issues involved in deciding that question on its
merits will remain buried as long as courts fail to explain both the reason
for nearly unlimited deference to a state censor's judgment (as in the
Fourth Circuit case), or, (as in California and Vermont) why the Consti-
tution requires that state taxpayers must not only tolerate, but also pay
for state prisoners' literary compositions.85
Consideration of the student editor censorship cases in connection with
other forms of potentially protected government speech not only high-
lights the exclusively public interests served by government freedom of
expression, but also helps begin the process of identifying the other kinds
of government expression that might qualify for first amendment protec-
tion. The government voices that so far have been protected (the student
editors) and those that might be, (e.g., dissenting judges) are legitimate
representatives of a significant public point of view, or public group, that
was not represented democratically by the higher government authori-
ties which wanted to suppress the speech. Students do not elect state
college officials. Judges may be elected, but their majority and minority
positions in particular cases are part of the democratic, representative
process only in a very attenuated sense. Ombudsmen typically police
within bureaucratic, civil service type organizations which persist while
elected officials come and go. Particular cases could develop the bound-
aries of the protection.
The student press sanction-censorship cases in themselves, however,
can be seen as establishing, in one area, constitutional protection for
state speech when the protected state speech is threatened by others
within the government, who would be censors. On a broader constitu-
tional level however, the idea of intra-governmental freedom of expres-
sion is already clearly established historically. As Professor Tussman8 6
" In California, the taxpayers arguably do not support the prison newspapers. Financ-
ing is from an inmate welfare fund, which derives its revenues from sales at the prison
canteen, and the sale of inmates' handicrafts and art work. Bailey, 32 Cal.3d at 911, 187 Cal.
Rptr. at 577, 654 P.2d at 760. But it seems clear from the Bailey and Huston opinions that
prison facilities are used. Overhead expenses are necessarily borne by the state. The state
is clearly the publisher. See id. at 1, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 583, 654 P.2d at 766; Huston, 196 Cal.
Rptr. at 157.
se j. TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 93-94 (1977):
Freedom of speech lies at the end of a long social road, not in the state of nature
at the beginning.... It might begin with the emergence in the dim past-already
an established institution in Homer and so familiar as not even to be explained-
of the herald, the divinely protected messenger moving between armies with the
ritual of parley, so that minds may meet and transform the clash of arms into
truce, into dialogue, even into agreement .... The more conventional history
comes to focus in seventeenth-century England with the struggle of Parliament
for the power to discuss and advise as it sees fit, with immunity against being a
called on royal carpets, against having "to answer in another place" for what is
[Vol. 34:267
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teaches us, the Speech or Debate Clause8 7 is a reminder in our federal
constitution that freedom of political expression began not as a generally,
popularly enjoyed liberty, but as a special immunity for the component of
British government sitting in Parliament in the seventeenth century, as
against the censorial impulses of the component of the British govern-
ment then sitting on the throne. In that sense then, there is really
nothing new in recognizing that the law of the land protects some
government speech from the same government's sanctions.
Treating the sanction-censorship cases as state speech cases is doctri-
nally sound.88 It also makes sense to treat a student publication as a form
said in the House .... Thus, freedom of political discussion can be seen as the
extension of parliamentary privilege to the electoral branch of government.
Id. See also Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1973).
s "[Fior any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not
be questioned in any other place." U.S. CONST. art. I, §6.
" City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979), is sometimes referred to as standing
for the Supreme Court's rejection of the idea that the first amendment protects government
speech. See Zeigler, Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official
Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REV. 578, 602-04 (1980); see also M. YUDOF, supra note 70, at 42-48
n.22, 49 (1983). In Anderson the Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question
the City of Boston's appeal from a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Boston's appeal was based on the first amendment and freedom of expression. The
Massachusetts' courts had enjoined the city from spending public money to influence the
outcome of the vote on a pending state referendum issue. (Earlier, the Supreme Court had
stayed the decision of the Massachusetts court (Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389 (1978)(Brennan,
J.)), and so Boston in fact was able to wage its electoral campaign). The effect of the
Supreme Court's eventual dismissal of the appeal was to leave standing the state court's
decision, 376 Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978), that the city, despite its first amendment
claim, could not legally engage in electoral campaign speech.
The Anderson case does not foreclose a state speech analysis of the school paper cases. The
denial of a municipality's claimed first amendment right to engage in election campaign
speech has no direct or necessary bearing on any other form of government speech.
Moreover, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in reaching the decision that the
United States Supreme Court left standing did not rule out the possibility of some first
amendment protection for municipal speech-the Massachusetts court found that even if
the first amendment applied, the taxpayers who challenged the expenditure of city money
had established an interest sufficiently compelling to overcome the first amendment's
protection for the city's speech. 376 Mass. at 196-97, 380 N.E.2d at 637. Therefore the court
held that suppression of the city's speech was warranted. In any event, Anderson is a case
in which a claim to first amendment protection for government speech lost to censors who
were plaintiffs in a taxpayer's suit, while the school newspaper sanction-censorship cases
uphold the first amendment claim to protection for government speech against censors
within the government itself. Anderson is thus distinguishable from the school paper cases.
More recently the Supreme Court in Fed. Communications Comm'n v. League of Women
Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984), held unconstitutional the section of the Public Broadcasting
Act forbidding "editorializing" by public stations receiving federal subsidy. Two thirds of
these stations are operated and supported also by state and local governments. Id. at 3125
n.22. Neither the majority nor the four dissenting Justices paused at the invocation of the
first amendment to protect this form of "government" speech.
Other expressions of hostility to the idea of first amendment protection for government
1986]
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of protected government speech because that viewpoint is useful in
analyzing all the other issues that student publications generate. The
application of the state speech analysis is continued with respect to the
other kinds of student press disputes in the sections that follow.
III. OUTSIDER ACCESS TO STUDENT PUBLICATIONS
An important advantage of treating a student publication as a form of
protected government speech is that the viewpoint is useful in analyzing
all the other issues that student publications generate. Indeed, some of
the cases dealing with access to school papers already treat the student
press as government speech. While consistency in analysis is not neces-
sarily imperative, it would seem better than an approach to problems
that requires picking among first premises according to the particular
issue at hand.
There are four access cases, in two of which courts granted non-editors
access to the columns of a student publication,8 9 and in two of which
outsider access was denied.90 The cases that granted access, for paid
political ads, did so on the theory that operation of the school paper was
state action and that each paper had been established as a first
amendment "open forum."91 A dissent in one case that denied access
speech are also not persuasive when applied to the school newspaper cases. The thrust of
Professor Yudofrs objection, on principle, to constitutional protection for state speech is that
the true freedom of expression ideals that the first amendment embodies call for some
controls on government speech, lest the combination of big government and powerful
communications technology enables the government voice to drown out all other forms of
expression and kill diversity. See M. YUDOF, supra note 70, at 42-50, 301-06. Thus even on
Professor Yudofs own terms, recognition of constitutional protection for state speech in the
school newspaper cases should not be objectionable: the cases lead to more diversity not less.
Indeed, Professor Yudof thinks that the cases themselves are correctly decided for just that
reason; however he does not classify them as state speech cases. Id. at 218-20.
Whitton and Larson's oft quoted dictum that "the problem of freedom of speech in the
constitutional sense simply does not arise when the government itself is doing the
speaking" was also pronounced without reference to the school newspaper sanction-
censorship cases and it is of course at odds with what the courts have actually done in those
cases (if not with what they have said). J. WHITTON & A. LARSON, PROPAGANDA: TOWARDS
DISARMAMENT IN THE WAR OF WORDS 242 (1964)(quoted in Van Alstyne, The First Amendment
and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda in the United States: Comments and
Footnotes, 31 LAW AND CONTEMP. PRoas. 530, 531 (1966); requoted in M. YUDOF, supra note 70,
at 44, n.27)).
11 Lee v. Bd. of Regents, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969), affd, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th
Cir. 1971); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
9o Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, reh'g denied, 541 F.2d 281 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
11 "As a campus newspaper, the Royal Purple constitutes an important forum for the
dissemination of news and expression of opinion. As such a forum, it should be open to
anyone who is willing to pay to have his views published therein-not just to commercial
advertisers." Lee, 306 F. Supp. at 1100-01; see also, Lee, 441 F.2d at 1259. "We have found,
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(for gay rights ads and announcements) also invoked "open forum"
theory. 92
The majority in Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock,9 3 the gay rights
ad case, denied access because the court found that a paper run by
students was not a form of state action.S6 The other case denying access
held that there was no constitutional right to have an article published in
a state university law review because the plaintiff-author had not
established any right to use the law review as a medium of expression.9.5
It seemed to go without saying that state support for the law review,
which the court acknowledged, added nothing to the case for publication.
Open forum theory was not mentioned.
In treating student publications as open forums, the courts recognized
that the reality of state action is not diminished because a student editor
and not a school administrator is in charge of a state subsidized
publication. This was tantamount, particularly where student editors
were defendants, 96 to considering the student paper a form of government
speech. Moreover, examination of the implications of the Gay Alliance
case, which mistakenly rejected the state action theory, is even more
helpful in clarifying that the student publications are better seen as a
form of government speech. In Gay Alliance, the rationale for the court's
conclusion that the editorial decision to reject the gay rights ad was
private action began with the premise that any attempted interference
with that editorial decision by school administrators would have been
forbidden by the first amendment;97 the hypothetical administrative
from review of its contents, that within the context of the school and educational
environment, [the Huguenot Herald] is a forum for the dissemination of ideas." Zucker, 299
F. Supp. at 105.
92 Mississippi Gay Alliance, 536 F.2d at 1080-84 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
93 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976).
" The Fifth Circuit, in affirming, quoted with apparent approval the district court's
opinion that "rejection of the [gay rights] advertisement 'does not constitute state action in
any sense of the term."' Id. at 1075. The Fifth Circuit also found "special reasons" for
upholding a ban on gay rights ads: Mississippi's criminal statute forbidding "Unnatural
Intercourse." Id. at 1075. The Gay Alliance ad offered legal aid. The circuit court said
"[s]uch an offer is open to various interpretations, one of which is that criminal activity is
contemplated, necessitating the aid of counsel." Id. at 1076 n.4. "The editor ... had a right
to take the position that the newspaper would not be involved, even peripherally, with this
off-campus homosexually related activity." Id. at 1075-76. The majority's short opinion is
heavy with homophobia. See id. at 1075 (reference to an "off-campus cell of homosexuals").
9' Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
" Student members of the college's Student Publications Board were defendants in Lee
v. Bd. of Regents, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969), as were student members of the
school paper's staff. The student staff members and the Student Publications Board were
responsible for the policy forbidding "editorial advertisements" successfully challenged by
non-staff student plaintiffs. id. at 1099. Thus the student editors were the would-be censors.
" "As a matter of fact, in the context of the matter before us, this Court has held that
the University authorities could not have ordered the newspaper not to publish the Gay
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interference would clearly have constituted state action; the first amend-
ment (typically) protects private action against the state, and so the
editor's decision, which would have been protected, therefore had to be a
form of private, not state action. From that logic, coupled with the
Supreme Court's decision in Miami Herald v. Tornillo,98 it followed that
the decision of the student editor to deny access was itself entitled to first
amendment protection.99
Thus, if the Gay Alliance case is correct in characterizing student
editors as private publishers, the two cases allowing outsider access to
campus papers must either be wrong, because under Tornillo private
publishers do have constitutional protection against such outsider access,
or those two cases form a special exception to the Tornillo rule and some
"private publishers", namely student editors, do owe the public some
right of access. In effect, equating the student editor of a subsidized
publication with the publisher of a purely private newspaper such as the
Miami Herald either oversimplifies the campus press access issue (while
foreclosing consideration of the reasons students might be entitled to
access to their "student" newspapers) or it overcomplicates Tornillo and
tortures its own private publisher analysis by suggesting an exception to
the ordinary "no access" rule, (the exception to be triggered by public
subsidy).
The Gay Alliance case also exposes the strain the private speech
interpretation puts on the actual facts in typical cases. The paper in Gay
Alliance was paid for in major part from non-waivable fees charged to
students; it was printed on state university facilities; 100 and it was
probably perceived by its audience as the university's "official" campus
newspaper. 101 "Private action" in that context is at best a legal fiction.
And since even in the cases in which the editors' rights are upheld
Alliance advertisement, had it chosen to do so." Gay Alliance, 536 F.2d at 1075 (citing
Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973)).
9s 418 U.S. 241 (1974)(cited in Gay Alliance, 536 F.2d at 1075). Tornillo held that there
was no right of access to the pages of a private newspaper; a statute granting such access
was itself unconstitutional because it violated the first amendment rights of the newspaper
publisher.
99
Since there is not the slightest whisper that the University authorities had
anything to do with the rejection of the material offered by this off-campus cell of
homosexuals, since such officials could not lawfully have done so, and since the
record really suggests nothing but discretion exercised by an editor chosen by the
student body, we think the [f]irst [a]mendment interdicts judicial interference
with the editorial decision.
Gay Alliance, 536 F.2d at 1075.
100 536 F.2d at 1074.
ole Cf. 536 F.2d at 1085 n.25: "If facts were found on remand to establish public
perception of the Reflector as the official campus newspaper, the state action determination
could be made with more confidence." (Emphasis added).
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against administrative censorship, that legal fiction will not stand
analysis, its imposition in the access cases is all the less desirable.
However, while the "open forum" opinions constitute authority for
treating student publications as "government speech," and the access
cases in general demonstrate that the government speech analysis makes
sense factually, the access cases also demonstrate that the "open forum"
approach provides only a very imprecise tool for determining whether
and when outsiders should be granted access to the columns of student
publications. The open forum theory as applied in the cases proves too
much, because it would take away from a student editor any power to
edit.
The cases that applied the theory analogized the school paper to a
campus speaker's bureau,1°2 a school auditorium,103 a public park, 10 4 and
the advertising placard spaced in public transit cars. 0 5 The logic of such
opinions would turn the school newspaper into a campus bulletin board.
Yet there is no intimation in the opinions that the courts that used the
open forum approach intended or foresaw that the application of its logic
would deny student editors the power to edit their publications. The
theory's implications are simply inconsistent with student publications
staffed by editors exercising editorial prerogatives. The imprecision of the
open forum idea as an analytical tool is also clearly demonstrated by
considering its possible application in the law review case.10 6 A law
review is clearly a forum for the expression of ideas. Yet it seems
inconceivable that there should be any constitutional right to have one's
article published in a state university law review.
The open forum theory, as applied, and as invoked in the dissent in the
Gay Alliance case, may also prove too little, because in all three cases the
newspapers had already established advertising or other relatively open
sections, and the issue presented was whether the plaintiffs' particular
messages could be refused publication on account of their content while
other advertisements and messages were printed.1o 7 The cases (including
102 See Lee v. Bd. of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257, 1259 (7th Cir. 1971)(citing Brooks v. Auburn
University, 269 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala. 1969)(a campus speakers bureau case)).
1' Id. (citing Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885
(1946)(a school auditorium case)); see Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1969)(citing Danskin).
104 See Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1082 (5th Cir. 1976)(dis-
senting opinion).
105 See Lee v. Bd. of Regents, 306 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (W.D. Wis. 1969), affd, 441 F.2d
1257 (7th Cir. 1971), and Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), both citing
public transit cases decided before the Supreme Court held in Lehman v. Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974), that there was no right of access for political ads to transit placard
space.
ioe Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
107 See Mississippi Gay Alliance, 536 F.2d at 1076 (dissenting opinion); Lee, 441 F.2d at
1259; Zucker, 299 F. Supp. at 103.
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the dissent) therefore do not stand for any generalized right of access to
all school papers.
The Gay Alliance dissent suggests that the proper approach is to
enforce a constitutional right of access only to the part of a student
newspaper which has already been set aside for paid advertising or free-
announcements.108 The part of the paper containing "editorial product"
would be left under the control of the editor and not open to outsider
access. The dissent recognized that deciding whether a guest column or
letter to the editor belonged in one category or the other might raise
problems, but left to future cases precise definition of the boundaries of
the student paper's two component parts.1 09
In effect, the Gay Alliance dissent responds to the constitutional law
question: "Should there be public access to student newspapers?" by
positing the existence of a bifurcated publication, one part of which would
not be a public forum, and hence not open to public access, and the other
part of which, labeled explicitly the "Bulletin Board" or open forum part,
would be available for public use. This is an ultimately unsatisfying
resolution of the issue not only because of its artificiality, but because it
leaves unexplained why student editors should have the right to express
their ethical values in the editorial part of the school paper and not have
the right to express exactly the same values in the advertising section by,
for example, refusing to run an ad for a term paper writing service. 110
Moreover, to try to answer questions about the limits of state power, as
exercised by the editor, and the rights of citizens who want to use public
facilities for expression, in terms of the nature of the medium of
expression, its fitness for expressive purposes, and its dedication to public
use, is to head up the same analytic blind alley that plagues much "open
forum" discussion: the search for descriptions and characteristics of the
particular public places (such as certain kinds of columns in the news-
paper) which the people have a right to use for expression. Just as it
makes little sense to think about the Constitution going in and out of
effect depending upon where, physically, one stands to make a speech, it
does not add to our understanding of access problems to try to locate the
newspaper sections where the first amendment protects the public.'1 1
Nevertheless, such a formalistic geography-bound approach to the open
forum issue was apparently endorsed by the Supreme Court long after
Gay Alliance in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n. 12
The Perry rationale was later applied in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
"'e Mississippi Gay Alliance, 536 F.2d at 1087-89.
109 Id.
10 The student editor of The South End at Wayne State University refused to run
military recruiting advertising to protest U.S. military policy in Central America. Cleve-
land Plain Dealer, Sept. 6, 1985, at 3B, col. 1.
... See Note, The First Amendment in Conflict: Advertising Access to State University
Student Newspapers, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 763, 788 (1984).
112 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.113 Perry dealt with a teachers'
union's right of access to the schools teachers' schoolhouse mailboxes, and
to the school system's internal mail delivery system. Access to the system
and to the mailboxes meant rapid delivery of union messages to the
teachers. The Court in Perry posited three kinds of government "forums"
for expression: 1) "Quintessential" public forums such as streets and
parks from which expressive activity could never be totally excluded; 114
2) other places that the government had decided to open to the public for
expressive use on a non-discriminatory basis1 15 (e.g., some meeting areas
within a public university); 16 and 3) "non-public forums," places that
neither tradition nor government designation had opened to the entire
public generally, 1 7 (e.g., Fort Dix, and transit car advertisement
spaces)."18 The Court found the teachers' mailboxes and delivery system
belonged in category three. 19
In categories one and two, besides reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations, the Court said that the only limits on speech permissible
under the Constitution, were limits that were narrowly drawn and
supported by a "compelling" state interest. 20 In category three, the
non-public forum, however, exclusions on the basis of subject matter and
the identity or status of the speaker were permissible, while, confusingly,
exclusion merely because public officials opposed the speaker's point of
view were not permitted. "The touchstone for evaluating these distinc-
tions [was] whether they [were] reasonable in light of the purpose [of] the
forum."121
In Perry, the school system had already given the Cub Scouts, the
YMCA, and a rival bargaining agent teacher's union access to the
teacher's mailboxes and the delivery system. 22 Yet it was allowed to
exclude the plaintiff union. In Cornelius, the Court held that the
Combined Federal Campaign, the federal employees charity drive, could
exclude the plaintiff because of a policy barring defense funds and
political advocacy groups from participating in the joint solicitation of
federal workers. As formulated in Perry, and elaborated on in Cornelius,
therefore, the rule for category three, "non-public forums," gives the
proprietors of a government platform large discretion in choosing who
can and who cannot have access. Nevertheless, Perry and Cornelius both
113 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985).
".. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
116 Id. at 45-46.
1' Id. at 45 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
117 Id. at 46-47.
'8 Id. at 47 (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)(Fort Dix), and Lehman v. Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)(transit car placards)).
119 Id. at 46.
120 Id. at 45-46.
121 Id. at 49.
122 Id. at 47.
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fobid "viewpoint" or content based exclusion, even from category three,
non-public forums, except for "compelling" not merely "reasonable"
justifications.
In what category is a school newspaper or other student publication?
The lower courts in school paper cases have analogized the school paper
to a campus speaker's bureau and to other (presumably) category two
forums. 123 Arguably the "bulletin board" part of a newspaper suggested
by the Gay Alliance dissent belongs in category two. A law review
presumably belongs in category three. In both cases, however, access can
be denied on the basis of content only if the government can establish a
"compelling interest" supporting denial.
If student editors wanted to exclude copy because of its content, the
issue would be whether the government's interest in giving student
editors the power to edit is "compelling" enough to let the editors "edit
out" the advertisements, announcements, or other offerings of which the
editors disapproved. The student editors might argue that the govern-
ment had an interest in creating community (school) newspapers and
other publications that duplicated as closely as possible the free market
press; that editorial discretion, including the right to deny access to
outsiders, was an essential characteristic of the classic American period-
ical; and that the government's interest in supporting that kind of real
newspaper (instead of running a bulletin board that looked like a
newspaper) was "compelling" enough to bar outsider access. The outsid-
ers presumably would develop arguments about the compatibility of at
least some outsider access with the government interests in vigorous,
tough-minded student editorial voice.
The access cases themselves provide little help in predicting how this
debate over the use of government speech facilities would turn out, for the
access cases do not focus on the government interests involved in
supporting student publications. Cases that do address that subject are
cases in which student outsiders challenged the exaction of mandatory
activity fees to subsidize school papers which printed political ideas to
which the outsiders objected; and it is these cases which are discussed in
the next section.
It should be clear, however, that the state speech analysis of student
publications, which two of the access cases take for granted as appropri-
ate, at least opens the door to arguments in favor of outsider access,
arguments which would be virtually impossible to make under the Fifth
Circuit's private speech-Tornillo approach to the access issue.
IV. THE MANDATORY FEE CASES
There are six cases in this category.
Four cases hold directly that students who disagree with their college
123 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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papers' editorial policy can nevertheless be forced to support the paper
through payment of mandatory activity fees.124
In another case, Stanley v. Magrath,125 the Eighth Circuit held that it
was unconstitutional for administrators to replace a mandatory fee
system with a voluntary fee system, in retaliation against the campus
papers' offensive "humor" edition. The district court had upheld the
administrators' decision to abolish mandatory fees. But even the district
court had said in dictum that the Constitution did not require the switch
from a mandatory to a refundable fee system. 126 Thus the Magrath case
at both the district and circuit levels strongly endorsed mandatory fees,
without holding directly that they were constitutional.
In the sixth case, student plaintiffs did not dispute payment of fees but
treated payment as a given; they then argued, unsuccessfully, that if
school papers were supported by mandatory fees the papers therefore had
to operate under rules forbidding publication of anti-religious anti-
Catholic blasphemy. 127
As elaborated below,' 28 the law on the basic mandatory fee issue
involved in five of the six cases would be the same whether the school
paper were considered a form of government speech or private speech.
But in the blasphemy case, and in another case1 29 that involved a college
paper with a racist editorial policy, the government speech analysis adds
a dimension and creates constitutional issues that would be absent if an
ordinary private publisher issued either blasphemous or racist tracts.
It is appropriate, however, to consider the coerced funding issue before
reaching the blasphemy-racism questions because if mandatory fees as
such are unconstitutional, it is unlikely that school papers could survive
financially to print blasphemy, racism, or anything else.
Some of the courts that upheld mandatory fees invoked the open forum
idea, either alone or in connection with another basis for decision. 130 It
should be clear, however, that the open forum idea is not helpful in
framing the issues. The courts that used the idea began with the premise
that a student newspaper was an open forum. They then observed that
124 Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983); Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp.
1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974), affd mem., 526 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913
(1976); Larson v. Bd. of Regents, 189 Neb. 688, 204 N.W.2d 568 (1973); Veed v.
Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149 (D. Neb. 1973), affd mem., 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974). See also Galda v. Bloustein, 516 F. Supp. 1142 (D.N.J.
1981); Good v. Associated Students, 86 Wash. 2d 94, 542 P.2d 762 (1975).
125 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983). This case cost the University of Minnesota $182,000 in
attorney fees paid to the student editors' counsel. Nat'l L.J., Feb. 27, 1984, at 6.
i26 Stanley v. Magrath, Civil No. 3-80-452, slip op. at 15 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 1982).
i27 Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 296 N.E.2d 238 (1973),
affg, 37 A.D.2d 987,327 N.Y.S.2d 755, (1971), rev'g, 60 Misc.2d 95,302 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1969).
12s See infra text accompanying notes 132-44.
129 Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
130 Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348, 1363 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Veed v. Schwartzkopf,
353 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D. Neb. 1973).
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establishment and subsidization of an open forum did not violate the first
amendment. Ergo, the courts concluded, students paying mandatory fees
had no basis for complaint under the first amendment.131
It is evident, of course, from the existence of a body of "open forum" law,
that the creation by the government of an open forum is not forbidden by
the first amendment. But the open forum idea is factually unsatisfactory
and therefore raises as many questions analytically in the mandatory fee
context as it does in the other areas of student press disputes. For
example, in Arrington v. Taylor,132 one of the cases that used the open
forum idea to justify mandatory fees, the so-called "open forum" had been
closed by its student editor to the publication of student opinion that
opposed mandatory fee subsidies for the paper.1 33 The irony may not have
been lost on the court, because the Arrington opinion also relied, in the
alternative, on the law dealing with one's right "not to associate;" it
applied that law to uphold coerced funding. 34 In any event, however,
since the "open forum" label is not descriptive of school papers whose
editors edit (censor) contents, a rationale for mandatory fees that builds
on the open forum analysis is intrinsically unpersuasive.
The Fourth Circuit, which had affirmed Arrington, later abandoned the
open forum approach in Kania v. Fordham,135 a case in which the result
in Arrington however was reconsidered and reaffirmed. Between the
Arrington and Kania decisions, the United States Supreme Court had
decided Abood v. Detroit Board of Education136 in which the Court held
that (1) under the Constitution, public employment could not be condi-
tioned on paying mandatory union fees that were expended on union
political activity unrelated to "core" union labor relations activity, but (2)
mandatory union fees were constitutional if used to support such "core"
union activity as collective bargaining and grievance adjustment. Abood,
delineating the circumstances in which government could and could not
make people pay for (associate with) ideological activities they disap-
proved of, was clearly pertinent to the coerced funding of a student
newspaper that took editorial positions of which some students disap-
proved. The district court in Kania therefore allowed new plaintiffs to
relitigate the same question decided earlier in Arrington: whether the
mandatory fee system used to support the University of North Carolina's
Daily Tarheel violated the rights of students who disagreed with the
Daily Tarheel's editorial policy. The Fourth Circuit then affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the university
131 Arrington, 380 F. Supp. at 1364; Veed, 353 F. Supp. at 153.
132 380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974), affd rnem., 526 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 175), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
133 Arrington, 380 F. Supp. at 1355.
"' Id. at 1360-63.
135 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983).
136 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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defendants, thereby upholding the university's use of the mandatory fee
to support the Tarheel.1
37
Abood was followed. Abood had held that coerced funding of "core"
collective bargaining activities was constitutional because of the exist-
ence of a significant state interest in collective bargaining as the key to
labor peace. 138 That governmental interest was sufficient to overcome the
first amendment objections to forced association raised by workers
ideologically opposed to collective bargaining. It followed and was also
held in Abood that compelled support for the political, ideological, and
social activities of the union was unconstitutional because those non-core
activities were not essential to the fulfillment of the state's interest in
labor peace. 139 Therefore, under Abood, workers had a limited right to
exemption from mandatory union fees. Forced association, through
payment of mandatory fees, to support enterprises that fulfilled a major
governmental interest was constitutional. But forced association with
non-essential activities was not constitutional.
In Kania, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the state's interest in
education and the Daily Tarheel's role as a "vital part of the university's
educational mission" were the kinds of important governmental interests
that Abood said justified imposing mandatory fees.' 40 In Kania, the
student newspaper was held to bear the same relation to the state's major
interest in higher education that the union's collective bargaining
activities, in Abood, bore to the government's major interest in labor
peace. 14 1
In Abood, of course, the result of the "state interest" analysis was that
mandatory support for ideas and ideologies (as opposed to collective
bargaining activities) was unconstitutional. By contrast, in Kania the
Fourth Circuit's application of the Abood analysis led to the rejection of
the plaintiffs' claims that they should not be forced to support a school
paper whose views and ideologies the plaintiffs opposed. The Fourth
Circuit attempted to minimize the apparent contradiction by maintain-
ing, probably correctly in fact, that the Daily Tarheel increased the
overall exchange of ideas and openness on campus, whereas in A bood, the
137 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983).
138 Abood, 431 U.S. at 224-27.
The government interests advanced by the agency-shop provision of the Michigan
statute are much the same as those promoted by similar provisions in federal
labor law.... The desirability of labor peace is no less important in the public
sector, nor is the risk of "free riders" any smaller.... Thus, insofar as the service
charge is used to finance expenditures by the Union for the purpose of collective
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment . .. decisions of
this Court appear to require validation of the agency-shop agreement before us.
Id.
139 Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-37.
140 702 F.2d at 480.
141 id.
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court said, the union's political activity reflected only one ideology. 142
That distinction, however, was considerably undercut by the circuit
court's acknowledgement that there was no way for the university to
require the newspaper to give equal access to the plaintiffs' dissident
views, or any viewpoints other than those of the editors. 143 There is no
escape from the conclusion that in Kania the A bood analysis was used to
uphold precisely what A bood said must be struck down: mandatory fees
to pay for viewpoints, ideologies, and political ideas that dissident
plaintiffs disagreed with. The seeming paradox is best resolved by
recognizing the extremely important place in society that the Kania
decision accorded to the independent, student edited, state subsidized
state university campus newspaper. The campus newspaper's role in
higher education was sufficiently large to justify the state university rule
forcing students to associate with the paper by paying for it with their
mandatory fees. 144
As noted above, analysis of the school paper-mandatory fee issue in
terms of Abood and the "right not to associate" does not depend on
characterizing the student newspaper as a form of state speech. 145 Indeed
the Abood case dealt with coerced funding to support the private speech
and expression of a private labor union. The opinion in Abood, however,
makes it clear that the law on the right not to associate is relevant to
some forms of state speech as well as to private speech. The point is
significant because ordinarily there is no need to provide justification for
compelled support of government speech. 146 The government speaks
constantly and supports its speech activities with money paid by taxpay-
ers, some of whom disagree with what the government says. No court as
yet has perceived constitutional issues in the appropriation of tax money
paid by pacifists to pay for army recruiting advertisements. Thus the
government speech analysis of the student press cases might seem to
suggest that there really is no student press "mandatory fee" issue:
student fee payers would have no more basis for objecting to what student
editors said in editorials than taxpayers would have for objecting to what
the President said in a Saturday afternoon talk on the radio. If this were
the logical consequence of applying the state speech analysis to the
student press, the Fourth Circuit in Kania would have reached the right
conclusion in upholding mandatory fees but would have followed an
unnecessarily complicated path to arrive at what should have be a very
simple decision: students who objected to mandatory fees would have had
to pay anyway-not because of the major state interest in a free, student
edited, campus press, but simply because the campus press was a form of
142 Id.
'4 Id. at 477 n.5.
'4 See Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 625 (1980).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 132-44.
14' See M. YUDOF, supra note 70, 237-45.
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government speech and therefore the public could not be heard to object
to paying for it.
Intuitively, such an outcome is troublesome. The government speech
analysis, if it led to such an outcome, would seem to oversimplify a
genuine issue. While all of the courts that dealt with the question upheld
mandatory fees, the results were not self-evident to the courts; nor did the
student plaintiffs' objections seem trivial. The usefulness of the state
speech analysis of the student press would be questionable if it trivialized
a real issue. In fact, however, as the opinion in Abood makes clear, the
state speech approach has no such consequence. The government interest
test used in Abood to justify (or strike down) forced financial association
with speech applies not only to private labor unions' speech, but also to
some forms of government speech as well. This is evident from the Abood
Court's reference to Lathrop v. Donahue,147 a case in which the Supreme
Court held that a state could make everyone who wanted to practice law
within that state pay dues to an integrated bar association which spent
some of the money on political and legislative activities. The integrated
state bar associations resources were derived from funds extracted from
lawyers practicing within the state. 148 The lawyers paid because of a
state court rule that made the payments mandatory.14 9 The reason for the
state's establishment of the integrated bar was that the bar's activities
served important state interests. 's When the funding system was
challenged, the bar association was represented in the United States
Supreme Court by the State Attorney General.' 5 ' The integrated bar
association's speech activities, in other words, were a form of "state
speech" akin to state speech in the student press. The basic factors
leading to the conclusion that student newspapers are state speech were
all present: state financial support, state institutional sponsorship, and
the absence of any identifiable private publisher.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lathrop was narrow. All the Court
held was that the rule that made lawyers belong to and financially
support the integrated bar association was not unconstitutional on its
face. 152 According to a four Justice plurality the question whether
lawyers who disagreed with the political positions taken by the inte-
grated bar association could nevertheless be forced to pay dues was not
yet ripe for decision. 153 The lengths to which the four member plurality
went in avoiding the question whether dissidents could be compelled to
support the integrated bar implies that they thought it was a difficult
147 367 U.S. 820 (1961)(cited in Abood, 431 U.S. at 233 n.29).
148 See Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 846: "There is an allegation that the State Bar's revenues
amount to about $90,000 a year, of which $80,000 is derived from dues .
149 Id. at 822.
150 Id. at 831-43.
151 Id. at 820. Other State Attorney Generals filed briefs amici curiae, id. at 821.
152 Id. at 842-43.
153 Id. at 845-48.
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constitutional issue. 154 The majority of the Court said that the constitu-
tional question was ripe for decision; but they disagreed among them-
selves about how it should be resolved.' 55 Thus at least five and probably
all nine Justices in Lathrop thought that a constitutional issue would be
presented if a case arose in which lawyers were forced to support an
integrated bar association, and there were specific political issues on
which the association spent money and on which some lawyer-plaintiffs
disagreed with the political positions taken.
The inference to be drawn from the Lathrop opinion therefore is that
compelled support for at least some forms of state speech must meet
constitutional standards. The Abood Court's reference to Lathrop indi-
cated that it regarded the Lathrop case as not significantly different from
Abood on its facts. In Abood the Court said that Lathrop would have
provided guidance on the "constitutional questions here presented" if
those questions had been addressed and authoritatively answered in
Lathrop. 1 5 6 Thus it is clear that in A bood the Supreme Court thought that
in cases where actual dissidents were compelled to support speech, the
same constitutional issue would be presented whether the speech was
that of a private labor union or that speech issued by the particular sort
of state agency that issued the state speech in Lathrop.
In describing the kind of state speech for which mandatory funding
schemes are problematical under the Constitution, it is helpful to
consider not only the facts in Lathrop, but a passage in Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Abood in which he spelled out why, ordinarily,
compelled support for state speech needs no justification:
[C]ompelled support of a private association is fundamentally
different from compelling support of government. Clearly, a local
school board does not need to demonstrate a compelling state
interest everytime it spends the taxpayer's money in ways the
taxpayer finds abhorent. But the reason for permitting the
government to compel the payment of taxes and to spend money
on controversial projects is that the government is representative
of the people. The same cannot be said of the union which is
representative only of one segment of the population, with certain
common interests. The withholding of financial support is fully
protected as speech in this context. 15 7
The observation that a school board can spend school taxes over the
' Id. at 845-46. See also id. at 848 ("1 must say, with all respect, that the reasons stated
in the plurality opinion for avoiding decision on this Constitutional issue can hardly be
regarded as anything but trivial.")(Harlan, J., concurring).
' Id. at 849 (Harlan, J., and Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 865 (Whittaker, J.,
concurring); id. at 866 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 878 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
116 Abood, 431 U.S. at 233 n.29.
157 Id. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring).
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protests of some of the taxpayers because the school board is a "repre-
sentative" body suggests that the category of state speech for which
compulsory financial support raises constitutional problems is narrow.
State organs that are not representative of the whole body politic and
that derive their revenues in whole or significant part from non-tax
assessments of their limited constituancy are uncommon. The integrated
bar is one example. A student newspaper is another.
Thus Lathrop and Abood not only provide a framework for decision in
which constitutional standards for student newspaper mandatory fees
can be articulated, the cases also make it clear that there is a real need
to articulate such standards even though the student press is a form of
government speech.
V. THE BLASPHEMY AND RACISM CASES
In the Kania case, and in the other typical mandatory fee cases, the
issue was whether the plaintiffs could be forced to pay for the publication
of ideas with which they disagreed. The merits and the very nature of the
underlying ideological conflict between the student-editors and the
student-plaintiffs was irrelevant. Kania and the other mandatory fee
cases therefore are different from the blasphemy case, Panarella u.
Birenbaum,158 in which the plaintiffs' position was not that mandatory
fees were always unlawful, but that printing blasphemy with the funds
collected through a mandatory fee system was unconstitutional under the
establishment clause of the first amendment. Typical mandatory fee
cases are also different from a censorship case, Joyner v. Whiting,159 in
which college authorities cut off funds for the college paper because of the
paper's racist editorial policy. The college officials regarded the racist
policy as unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment.160 In these
cases the substantive content of the publications, their blasphemy or
racism, makes the characterization of student publication as government
speech appear to be a significant factor in decision making. Private
speakers who blaspheme and issue racist diatribes ought to be quintes-
sential beneficiaries of first amendment protection. 161 As exponents of
's 32 N.Y.2d 108, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 296 N.E.2d 238 (1973), affg, 37 A.D.2d 987, 327
N.Y.S.2d 755 (1971), rev'g, 60 Misc.2d 95, 302 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1969).
159 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
1ro Id. at 458.
161 But see Note, Blasphemy, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 694 (1970), and Beauharnis v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952). There is little constitutional law on blasphemy but there have been several
successful prosecutions, in both the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Note, 70
COLUM. L. REv. at 702-10. Beauharnis upheld the conviction of a racist, under a group libel
statute- But Beauharnis is probably no longer good law. The Seventh Circuit declined to
follow it when the Village of Skokie sought to justify its prohibition of Nazi rallies. Collin
v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
Yet two Supreme Court Justices dissented from a denial of a stay of the Seventh Circuit's
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unpopular minority viewpoints they are the kind of speakers who most
need a right to express themselves freely. Underground, self-supporting
student newspapers that were anti-religious or racist would clearly have
a right to exist and publish. If subsidized student publications are merely
another form of private speech, like underground student papers, then
their right to be anti-religious and racist would be assured. However, if
student publications are a form of state speech, the establishment clause
and fourteenth amendment issues, not found in the private speech
context, would seem to be unavoidable.
In Joyner v. Whiting,162 however, the issues were avoided. The Fourth
Circuit held that racism in the student newspaper was not state action
but something different called "state advocacy" which was beyond the
reach of the fourteenth amendment. The Fourth Circuit held therefore
that the state subsidized racism was not only not forbidden by the
fourteenth amendment, but was protected against administrative censor-
ship by the first amendment.' 63
By contrast, in Panarella v. Birenbaum16 4 the New York Court of
Appeals dealt forthrightly with the establishment clause objection to
blasphemy in the student press. The manner in which the issue was
presented was unusual however. The plaintiffs were tax-paying and
mandatory fee paying students who sued not the student editors or
authors, but college officials. The relief sought was an order from the
court forcing the college officials to impose publication guidelines forbid-
ding the non-party student editors from publishing blasphemous articles
in the future. In effect, the plaintiffs wanted the court to turn the school
officials into unwilling censors. They failed. The court of appeals said that
"the test is not the appearance of derogatory or critical material, but
whether government, and government schools, maintain neutrality in
the sense of permitting all sides of any religious controversy to be raised
and never permit one side or another to be favored directly or indi-
rectly."165 On a record showing only a few blasphemous articles and no
systematic anti-religious editorial line, the court refused to force the
defendant to issue the content-based guidelines sought by the plaintiffs.
The defendant college officials' hands-off attitude, after setting up what
the court called a "neutral forum," was upheld.
The rationale in Panarella is weakened by its reliance on the "neutral
forum" idea. It was fortuitous that the same editors who published the
blasphemous articles did not print many more of them, but instead
order in the Skokie case, remarking that Beauharnis had never been explicitly overruled.
Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978).
M2 477 F.2d 456, 461-62 (4th Cir. 1973).
163 Id. at 467.
164 32 N.Y.2d 108, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 296 N.E.2d 238 (1973), affg, 37 A.D.2d 987, 327
N.Y.S.2d 755 (1971).
16 32 N.Y.2d at 118, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 339, 296 N.E.2d at 242.
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actually opened their pages to letters from readers complaining about
blasphemy. 66 The "neutral forum" that the court discovered in the facts
was the result of that fortuity.
Similarly, the overall significance of Panarella is somewhat reduced
because of the narrow question actually presented to the court: Are school
administrators correct in letting student editors exercise their own
editorial judgment in the student press? There was already so much law
supporting the defendant administrators' self-proclaimed powerlessness
to censor student newspapers that the plaintiffs' choice of defendants
gave their case a built in weakness.
16 7
Nevertheless, Panarella is important because its premise for decision is
that the establishment clause applies to the student press because the
student press is a form of government speech. Panarella's resolution of
the establishment clause issue in terms of open forum theory however is
inadequate.
How then should a case of blasphemy or of racism in the student press
be analyzed? Answers have to be tentative; however, the following
observations may be helpful in approaching the issues such cases raise.
First, there is no reason to preclude the possibility that an establish-
ment clause or fourteenth amendment violation could occur by reason of
speech alone. Some forms of speech are unlawful. Obscenity, 68 defama-
tion,' 69 some advertising,17 and fighting words' 71 are actionable in and
of themselves. Even when an offense is not inherently speech related, as
are defamation and obscenity, speech can be the means by which an
offense is committed: negligence may consist of transmitting a false
166 32 NY.2d at 117, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 338, 296 N.E.2d at 241.
16 The New York Appellate Division, after reciting the state speech-establishment
clause argument against blasphemy, ignored that point and held that Panarella was
controlled by the "weight of authority" to the effect that once school administrators had
established a "forum" the administrators could not put limits on the forum's use by
students. 37 A.D.2d at 988, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 757. Therefore it was held that the courts were
without power to force the administrators to "prevent attacks on religion" in the school
newspaper or to "enforce a strict neutrality toward religion" in the student press. Id.
(quoting the trial court's order). The controlling authority cited by the court included some
cases that viewed the school newspaper as a form of private speech, some cases that viewed
it as public speech, and the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), a
purely private speech case upholding the right of students to wear black arm bands to
protest the War in Vietnam. The appellate division's opinion in Panarella can be read as
rejecting, without explanation or reasoning, the state speech analysis. It can also be read as
holding that the freedom of the student press' from administrative censorship for some
reason is equivalent to freedom from first amendment establishment clause constraints. Or
it might be read as holding that the establishment clause does apply, but that blasphemy in
a state supported student newspaper does not constitute a violation.
' 8 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
"6 Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
'70 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 US. 447 (1978).
7i Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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telegraph message. 172 In one of the censorship cases, the court took it for
granted that flag desecration, a form of secular blasphemy, could be
enjoined in the student press.' 73 Posting the Ten Commandments on a
public school classroom wall is unlawful.174 So is teaching creationism in
the public schools. 175 Moreover, peculiarly governmental offenses exist.
They arise out of actions which would be innocent or at least not
actionable if performed by private individuals: self-help repossession
(which is lawful) would be a denial of due process if state action were
involved. 176
Does student editorship or authorship confer some immunity on state
speech putting it beyond the control of the establishment clause and of
the fourteenth amendment? Under our system of checks and balances in
which sovereignty is exercised by no single government entity, the
relative weakness of the student voice, compared say, to the legislature's
voice, should not be dispositive. Restraints on government action apply to
each small fragment of the whole government system, no matter how
relatively unauthoritative or removed from central power the govern-
ment actor may be: water and sewer districts, and lame duck elected
officials all have to obey the general rules that limit government action.
The first amendment applies whether the state is acting as educator or in
some other role. 177 There is no reason why students, when they wield
some state power, in print, should not abide by the same rules. Indeed,
one of the premises for subsidized student press freedom is that student
editors are responsible people, legitimately able to represent the body of
students from which they are chosen. The duty to obey constitutional
mandates that apply to all others who act with the state's funds is
commensurate with constitutional protection for the student editor's
right to engage in state subsidized speech. Student editors should not be
immune from constitutional constraints. 7 8
There is not much authority on the tests for the application of those
172 See W.P. KEETON & W. PROSSER, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 362 (5th Ed. 1984). See
also Green, The Communicative Torts, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1975).
12' Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970), in which the court found the Maryland
flag desecration statute unconstitutional only as applied to the particular picture students
wanted to put on the cover of a publication; apparently if the statute had been constitu-
tionally applied, it could have been the basis for censorship.
174 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
175 McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (ED. Ark. 1982), affd, 723 F.2d
45 (8th Cir. 1983).
17' Compare Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)(self-help foreclosure, warehouse
lien) with North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975)(judicial
garnishment).
177 See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
881 (1982)(Blackmun, J., concurring opinion).
178 See Delgado, The Language of the Arms Race: Should the People Limit Government
Speech? 64 B.U.L. REV. 961 (1984) (examining the case for limiting government speech in
a different area).
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constraints. In Anderson v. Martin179 the Supreme Court held that at
least one form of racist government speech violated the fourteenth
amendment. A Louisiana law required that the race of every candidate
for elected office be listed on the ballot alongside the candidate's name.
The law violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Court said, because
by placing a racial label on a candidate at the most crucial stage
in the electoral process-the instant before the vote is cast-the
State furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so
aroused as to operate against one group because of race and for
another. This is true because by directing the citizen's attention
to the single consideration of race or color, the State indicates
that a candidate's race or color is an important-perhaps para-
mount-consideration in the citizen's choice, which may deci-
sively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial lines....
The vice lies not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the
power of the state behind a racial classification that induces
racial prejudice at the polls .... Race is the factor upon which the
statute operates and its involvement promotes the ultimate
discrimination which is sufficient to make it invalid.18 0
It is an understatement to say that the striking down in Anderson of a
starkly racist piece of state legislation, conceptually similar to the Nazi
law making Jews identify themselves by wearing the Star of David, does
not automatically compel the prohibition of either racism or anti-
Catholicism in a college newspaper. The Supreme Court's reaction to the
statute in Anderson stressed the likelihood of actual harm to the black
plaintiffs from the interplay between the state law and racial prejudice
within the state. Anderson was not a case of racial hostility in the
abstract. Particularized harm to the particular plaintiffs who were
candidates for elective office was forseeable. Furthermore, a narrow
reading of Anderson would help account for the scarcity of authority
establishing affirmatively that racial violations can be committed
through speech. Racism is a part of the fabric of American life, and
anti-racist efforts have consumed an enormous amount of judicial and
law enforcement energy. In that context the paucity of authority on the
legality or illegality of racist speech, whether private or public, suggests
that government racist speech is not a per se constitutional violation.
The same argument, from the realities of everyday life, cannot of
course, be made with respect to blasphemy. The absence of a volume of
precedent on blasphemy as an establishment clause violation is perfectly
understandable. Blasphemy is both rare, and when private, rarely
179 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
180 Id. at 402-04.
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objected to. l 8' Nevertheless, the Anderson case implies by analogy at
least that hostility to religion emanating from a government sponsored
source would only be actionable if it were addressed to a public that was
already anti-religious or, in terms of the facts in Panarella, anti-Catholic.
Thus racism and blasphemy in the student press are probably not
automatically actionable; yet they are clearly not automatically immune
from constitutional control either. The fact that such speech may be
"advocacy" and that it originates with students should not insulate it
from judicial review. The issue should be whether racist government
speech in the student press actually harms anyone. One can imagine
contexts in which real harm would likely occur and therefore be subject
to proof, and other contexts in which the only harm done would be to the
reputation of the racist or anti-religious editors themselves. The court in
Joyner sensed that this was the real issue in that case: it found and noted
in passing that there was "no proof that the editorial policy of the paper
incited harrassment, violence or interference with white students and
faculty."'18 2 The court's decision upholding the student editors was
probably correct not because the editors were students, but because their
racist editorials were not proven to have been effective in really hurting
anyone. Similarly, in Panarella, the court may have been willing to
tolerate hostility to Catholicism in a government publication because of
the improbability of harm to anything besides the plaintiffs' sensibilities.
However, in both kinds of cases, the fact that the publications involved
were government speech, paid for by the people, should lead courts to
make the kinds of inquiries into actual or potential harm which are
suggested by the Supreme Court's handling of the Anderson case.
VI. THE DEFAMATION CASES
There are two cases that deal explicitly with the question of public
institutional liability for defamation in the student press. The New York
Court of Claims in Mazart v. State of New York 8 3 held that plaintiffs
libeled by a state university student newspaper had no claim against the
state. In Milliner v. Turner'8 4 a Louisiana appellate court held that libel
victims had no claim against the state university. 8 5
"' See Note, Blasphemy, 70 COLuM L. REV. 694 (1970).
152 Joyner 477 F.2d at 461.
183 109 Misc.2d 1092, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981).
l 436 So.2d 1300 (La. App. 1983).
155 There are a handful of other cases in which public colleges were defendants in libel
cases arising out of matters printed in student publications, and in which the courts did not
reach the issue of public institutional liability as such.
In Scelfo v. Rutgers, 116 N.J. Super. 403, 282 A.2d 445 (1971), summary judgment was
granted in favor of the university and other defendants because the publication was not
libelous as a matter of law and not malicious under the standard in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Truth was an absolute defense in a libel action against the
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In Mazart the court posited and rejected two theories of liability: "(1)
respondeat superior (i.e. the University, as principal, might be liable for
the torts of its agents, the student paper and editors), and (2) ... the
University, may have been negligent in failing to provide guidelines to
University of Texas Bd. of Regents on account of an article in the Dailey Texan. Mitcham
v. Bd. of Regents, No. 9196 (Tex. Ct. App., Apr. 3, 1984)(available on LExIs, States Library,
Texas file).
In Madison v. Yunker, 180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978), the Montana Supreme Court
held unconstitutional, under the Montana Constitution, a "retraction statute" which made
a demand for retraction a prerequisite to the bringing of a libel case. The court reversed a
judgment for all defendants based on the retraction statute and remanded the case for trial.
The University of Montana was a defendant, together with the student newspaper and
others. The university had raised a separate additional defense, the failure of plaintiffs to
file a claim against it pursuant to a state statute dealing with tort claims against a political
subdivision. The Montana Supreme Court did not discuss that defense. The university
apparently raised no other special defenses and from all that appears, therefore, did not
consider itself immune from liability for defamation in the student press.
In Johnson v. Bd. of Junior College Dist. No. 508, 31 Ill. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d 442
(1975), the allegedly defamatory material published in the campus newspaper was held
privileged under New York Times v. Sullivan. The college teachers who were plaintiffs were
"public figures" under the test of Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Johnson,
31 111. App.3d at 276, 334 N.E.2d at 447.
In Naylor v. Minnesota Daily, 342 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. 1984), the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that failure to give a statutory notice was not a basis for dismissal of a case
against the state, under the Minnesota Tort Claims Act. The defendants included the
campus newspaper and the University of Minnesota. The defendants had moved for
dismissal on a number of other grounds not specified in the supreme court's opinion;
however, the state of Minnesota had itself intervened as a defendant in the case, implying
that it recognized its potential liability. The case was remanded for trial.
In Big Wheel Restaurants, Inc. v. Bronstein, 158 Ind. App. 422, 302 N.E.2d 876 (1973),
the Daily Student, the newspaper at Indiana University, was initially a defendant along
with the restaurant that had placed an allegedly libelous advertisement in the paper. When
the newspaper's motion to dismiss on grounds not stated in the opinion was granted, the
plaintiff abandoned that aspect of its case and proceeded against the restaurant alone.
Similarly, in Klahr v. Winterble, 4 Ariz. App. 158, 418 P.2d 404 (1966), the plaintiff
apparently assumed from the outset that he had no defamation case against the University
of Arizona, and so sued the student editors of the campus paper instead of the university
itself.
There are undoubtedly other unreported cases. See Bruex v. Snyder, Civil No. 724207H
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Kalamazoo County, filed Nov. 2, 1972)(libel action against the Western
Michigan University campus newspaper), cited in Note, Tort Liability of a University For
Libelous Material in Student Publications, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1064 n.21 (1973).
There are also libel cases against private universities brought on account of material in
student publications. Langford v. Vanderbilt University, 44 Tenn. App. 694, 318 S.W.2d 568
(1958); Wallace v. Weiss, 82 Misc.2d 1053, 372 N.Y.S.2d 416 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975)(Univer-
sity of Rochester). See also Ithaca College v. Yale Daily News Publishing Co., 105 Misc.2d
793, 433 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1980), affd mem., 85 App. Div.2d 817, 445 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1981).
And The University of Wisconsin Regents made a non-cash settlement of a trademark
case brought against them on account of unauthorized use of the "Peanuts" character in a
campus newspaper. The Regents agreed to take "responsible action" if the unlawful use
occured again. AGB NoTEs, May 1983, at 2 [AGB Notes is published by the Association of
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges].
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the . . . staff regarding libel . . . and . .. the need to review and verify
letters to the editor."'18 6
There was no liability on the respondeat superior theory because the
university had no control over the paper and its staff and therefore, the
court concluded, there was no principal-agent relationship between the
state and the editors who were directly responsible for the libel.'i 7 There
was no control because the first amendment forbade university officials
from exercising editorial control over the paper's content. 88
There was no negligence because the journalistic standard that the
editors failed to meet was so elementary that the editors' ignorance of it
was not foreseeable by school administrators; hence the state had no duty
to provide the editors with guidelines.18 9
The disposition of the Louisiana case was similar. At the trial level the
university has been held liable for the student edited defamation (1)
because of a section in the Louisiana Civil Code that provided that
"teachers and artisans are answerable for the damage caused by their
scholars or apprentices, while under their superientendence. In the above
cases, responsibility only attaches, when the ... teachers... might have
prevented the act which caused the damage, and had not done it;"190 and
(2) because the university was negligent in not providing as much faculty
control over the paper as its "Student Guide" purported to require. 19 1 On
appeal the judgment against the university was reversed; it was held that
the civil code provision and, by implication, the self-imposed "guidance"
responsibility, were both inconsistent with the freedom of the press
enjoyed by the student newspaper under the first amendment.19 2
The respondeat superior-"control" issue in the Mazart case in New
York is best understood in terms of New York law on sovereign immunity
as that law has developed and been applied to damages caused by judicial
officers. The state of New York is not liable for such damages. 193 The
rationale is that judicial officers are not subject to orders or control from
other people within the state government. Lack of control makes the
doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable. But the non-liability of the
state, where respondeat superior is inapplicable, is attributed by the
cases to the state's decision not to waive immunity where it lacks control
186 Mazart, 109 Misc.2d at 1098, 441 N.Y.S. 2d at 604.
187 Id. at 1099, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 604-05.
188 Id. at 1099, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
18' Id. at 1103, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
19o LA Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2320 (West Supp. 1986)(quoted in Milliner, 436 So.2d at 1302).
191 Milliner, 436 So.2d at 1302.
192 Id. at 1303.
' See Rossman v. State, 40 A.D.2d 1046, 338 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1972); Jamieson v. State, 7
A.D.2d 944, 182 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1959); Koeppe v. City of Hudson, 276 A.D. 443, 95 N.Y.S.2d
700 (1950); Murph v. State, 98 Misc.2d 324, 413 N.Y.S.2d 854 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1979); see also,
Instalment Department, Inc. v. State, 21 A.D.2d 211, 250 N.Y.S.2d 124 (1964)(holding the
same result for the New York Attorney General when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity).
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over the tortfeasor. 194 Under New York law then, lack of state liability is
nevertheless consistent with state action: if a judge's torts were not state
action, there would be no need for the state to invoke sovereign immunity
as a defense in the first place.
If this judicial gloss on the New York Court of Claims Act is read into
the Mazart case, and student editors (who can not be controlled by school
officials) are analogized to state judges, the result on the respondeat
superior issue in Mazart is thus consistent with characterizing the
student editors' libel as state speech. The reason that New York was not
liable was not that the defamation was not state speech, but that the state
had not consented to be liable for its "speech-action" under the no-control
circumstances of the case.
The reasoning in the Louisiana case is essentially the same. While
waiver of sovereign immunity was not the touchstone for decision, the
university's liability under the civil code depended on the university's
capacity for control of the student paper; and under the first amendment,
the university lacked control. Both the Louisiana and New York deci-
sions are state law decisions, with the state law, however, shaped by the
first amendment's limits on the state school's power to control the
subsidized student press.
Disposition of the negligence issue in Mazart was also consistent with
the state speech analysis: the New York court simply held that the school
officials who had not issued guidelines pointing out obvious, common
sense journalistic standards, were blameless even though a libel oc-
curred. Since the school officials were without fault, their behavior was
not a basis for state liability. This resolution of the issue implies that
there might, however, be some way in which nonfeasance or misfeasance
by school officials could lead to state liability for what is published in a
school paper. That potential for liability should be contrasted with the
state's potential for liability with respect to private or underground
student newspapers. Would state university officials be held to the
exercise of any duty of care or prudence whatsoever in providing
guidelines to students running their own independent publication? There
are no cases, but the answer would seem to be clearly "No." Thus the
court's handling of the negligence issue, which included examination of
the reasonableness of the school officials' conduct vis-a-vis the subsidized
student paper, suggests that the court of claims viewed the subsidized
paper as a form of speech significantly different from the private speech
that students might engage in without state subsidy.
The Mazart decision seems clearly correct on the negligence issue. As
the court pointed out, it would have been a jury question in New York
194 In addition to finding no control by the state, the cases also hold that judges are not
state officers within the meaning of the Court of Claim Act. See, Rossman v. State, 40
A.D.2d 1046, 338 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1972); Jamieson v. State, 7 A.D.2d 944, 945, 182 N.Y.S.2d
41, 42 (1959). See generally, 19A CARMODY-WAIT 2D NEW YORK PRACTICE, §§120:1-2 (1979).
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whether newspaper editors must verify, before publication, who is really
responsible for a letter to the editor which identified its purported
authors as homosexuals. The student editors, as adult citizens, would
have been eligible to sit on a New York jury faced with that question.
Hence it was not negligent for school officials to omit to give guidelines
to student editors on a question they and all other adults would have been
presumed competent to answer as jurors.195
However, evaluation of the "respondeat superior" part of the Mazart
decision requires consideration of 1) the New York rule that sovereign
immunity is not waived with respect to actions taken on behalf of the
state by people not under the "control" of the state; and 2) whether even
that "control" rule actually applied in the student newspaper context.
The New York sovereign immunity rule raises the question why
victims of harm caused by state judges, acting as state judges, and by
student editors, using state facilities as editors, should not be compen-
sated by the state. The Mazart opinion offer no explanations; it merely
points out the lack of control, and draws the conclusion of no state
liability as if it were self-evidently correct. Perhaps under the New York
sovereign immunity law no other result was possible. But the wisdom of
that immunity law seems questionable. The Mazart court recognized that
the unfortunate but probably inevitable consequence of its decision was
that the victims of the libel would have no effective remedy; the student
editors were probably judgment proof.19 6 This was the result despite the
fact that the state university benefited in many ways from the existence
of the campus newspaper and the university's funding for the paper
provided the climate in which it could flourish. It seems to be at least
arguable that the state should pay for harm caused by people who are not
under the control of the state but have nevertheless been put into a
position by the state that makes it possible for them to cause the harm. 197
Moreover, even if New York's no control-no liability rule were an
appropriate limit on the state's waiver of sovereign immunity, it is
further questionable whether the rule was properly applied to the facts in
Mazart. The court applied the rule because the student editors were not
under the control of school administrators. The court did not, however,
explore the possibility that the editors were answerable to a student
publication board or other student organization. Control over student
editors by such a student organization is legally distinguishable from
control by administrators because the legitimacy of the editors' freedom
from censorship by school administrators is a function of the editors' role
as spokesperson for student interests. Hence accountability to organized
student interests, and subjection to "control" by such interests, is proba-
bly compatible with the Constitution. Indeed, some such accountability is
'9 109 Misc.2d 1092, 1103, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600, 607.
'9 See 109 Misc.2d at 1102, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
197 See Note, supra note 185, at 1077-83.
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arguably a prerequisite for the lawfulness of the state's action in putting
its publication facilities at the disposition of student editors. Such
accountability is also a desirable check on editors, similar to marketplace
pressures felt by non-subsidized publications. To the extent there was
such student control over the student editors at the state university
where the Mazart case arose, the wisdom of the decision in Mazart is
made even more questionable.
The same criticisms apply to the Milliner opinion from Louisiana.
Again, the result may have been required under the civil code provision
that insulated teachers (interpreted to mean the university itself in
Milliner) from liability for the acts of their "scholars and apprentices"
when the teachers could not prevent the scholars from causing damage.
But again, the wisdom of such a result is questionable.
In any event, the Mazart and Milliner cases, as decided, are perfectly
compatible with the state speech analysis of student publications. And
while the courts may have felt constrained not to provide a remedy for the
wrong the plaintiffs suffered due to New York's limited waiver of
immunity, and Louisiana's Civil Code provision, a non-state speech
analysis would require such an unfair result in all other jurisdictions.
Mazart's and Milliner's unfortunate results, denying relief to people
clearly injured by a state instrumentality, need not be repeated else-
where if the state speech analysis is adopted. Only under that analysis
can courts reach the merits of government financial responsibility for
harm to reputation caused by the subsidized student press. It is possible
that on the merits, the questionable results in Mazart and Milliner are
correct, but the search for an answer is possible only if the subsidized
student press is recognized as a form of government speech.
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